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IV. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The statutory authority conferring jurisdiction on the Utah 
Supreme Court to decide this appeal is Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-
2(3)(j). 
V. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. After the Utah Supreme Court ruled that the depositors 
could bring their claims alleging gross negligence against Brimhall 
and Borthick did the lower court commit reversible error in 
granting Borthick1s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings by ruling 
that he had no duty to the depositors? 
2. May the lower court dismiss the depositors' claims on the 
basis of a statute of limitations, after the Utah Supreme Court 
ruled that no statute of limitations bars the depositors' claims? 
3. Did the lower court commit reversible error in failing to 
apply the U.R.C.P. 23 criteria when it denied class action 
certification to this litigation? 
4. Did the lower court commit reversible error in failing to 
state any reason for denying class action certification to this 
litigation? 
The standard of review for each issue follows: All issues 
raised from the appeal of the adverse summary judgment are issues 
of law with no deference to the trial court. Feree v. State, 784 
1 
P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1989). Specifically, whether a duty exists is 
a question of law. Id. at 1189; Weber by and through Weber v. 
Sprinqville. 725 P.2d 1360, 1363 (Utah 1986); but see, Beach v. 
University of Utah. 726 P.2d 413, 416 (1986). 
Whether a statute of limitations bars a claim is also a 
question of law. e.g., Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 246 (Utah 
1988); Beck v. Dutchman Coal Mines Co.. 269 P.2d 867 (Utah 1959). 
The question of whether the lower court failed to apply or 
misapplied Rule 23 is also a question of law. See, Call v. West 
Jordan. 727 P.2d 180, 183 (Utah 1986). 
VI. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. 
ORDINANCES. RULES AND REGULATIONS 
Citations for determinative constitutional provisions, 
statutes, ordinances, rules and regulations follow: 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 7-1-1, 7-1-3, 7-1-7, 7-1-8, 7-1-13, 7-1-14, 7-1-
17, 7-1-18, 7-1-26, 7-1-27, 7-1-102, 7-1-301, 7-2-1, 7-10-1, 63-30-
4, 70B-1-102, 70B-3-503, 70B-3-504, 70B-3-506, 70B-6-103, 70B-6-
104, 70B-6-10, 70B-6-110, 78-2-2(3)(j), 78-12-25, 78-12-26, 78-12-
28, 78-12-29. 
They are set out verbatim in the addendum to this brief. 
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VII. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from three orders of the Third Judicial 
District Court, the Honorable Pat B. Brian presiding: 
A. An order granting summary judgment to former Commissioner 
of the Department of Financial Institutions, W. Smoot 
Brimhall ("Brimhall"). The court ruled that the statute 
of limitations bars the depositors1 claims against him. 
B. An order granting former Commissioner of the Department 
of Financial Institutions, Mirvin D. Borthick's 
("Borthick") Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. The 
court ruled that the commissioners had no duty to the 
depositors and that the claims were barred by common law 
good faith immunity. 
C. An order denying class action certification to the 
depositors1 litigation. 
VIII. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT TO THE ISSUES 
PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
A motion for judgment on the pleadings must be based on the 
undisputed facts as they appear in the pleadings. All material 
allegations in the pleadings by the opposing party are accepted as 
true. All contested factual issues are resolved in favor of the 
opposing party. e.g., Noel v. Olds, 149 F.2d 13 (D.C.App. 1945); 
3 
Rosenhan v. U.S., 131 F.2d 932 (10th Cir. 1942). In addition, the 
court received matters outside of the pleadings from the 
depositors. As to the depositors' evidentiary materials, 
Borthick's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is treated in the 
same fashion as Brimhall's Motion for Summary Judgment. U.R.C.P. 
12(c) . That is, on appeal, the party against whom the judgment has 
been granted is entitled to have all the facts presented and all 
the inferences fairly arising therefrom considered in a light most 
favorable to him. e.g., Whitman v. W.T. Grant Co., 395 P.2d 918 
(Utah 1964). In light of the foregoing principals, the facts 
relevant to the issues presented for review, are as follows: 
The appellants are 11 depositors who lost their savings in 
Grove Finance Company ("Grove Finance"). The respondents are the 
former Commissioners of the Utah Department of Financial Insti-
tutions ("Department"). Brimhall was commissioner from 1965 to 
1979 and Borthick served as Brimhall's successor from 1979 to 
November of 1981. (R.2-8, 34-51.) 
Grove Finance was licensed by the Department as a small loan 
business (Utah Code Ann. § 7-10-1 et seq.) and beginning in 1970 
transacted a banking business by receiving money on deposit. 
(R.3,6, 557). 
In 1969, the Utah legislature passed the Utah Uniform Consumer 
Credit Code (Title 70B). Thereafter, commissioners Brimhall and 
Borthick determined that Grove Finance should be licensed as a 
4 
supervised lender. (R. 557.) Supervised lenders are authorized to 
make loans but they are not authorized to receive deposits. The 
commissioners knew, or should have known, that Grove Finance was 
accepting deposits and transacting a banking business contrary to 
Tile 7 and 70B. (R. 558-60). (Gary Cox depo. pp. 41, 57; Frank 
Stuart depo. p. 3 3.) That is, Grove Finance sold debentures to the 
public. The debentures were set up in such a way that they were 
nothing more than accounts on deposit. (R. 557, 591, 592.) A 
sample deposit account ledger is attached in the addendum. 
Title 7 and Title 70B of the Utah Code imposed specific duties 
upon the commissioners to examine, investigate and supervise Grove 
Finance. The defendant commissioners failed in these statutory 
duties with respect to Grove Finance as follows: 
a) They did not conduct the annual examinations required by 
Utah Code Ann. § 7-1-8; 
b) They did not annually determine whether Grove Finance was 
violating the law as required by Utah Code Ann. § 7-1-14; 
c) They did not receive and publish the financial reports 
described in Utah Code Ann. § 7-1-17; 
d) They did not call for the special financial reports 
necessary for the protection of the public as set forth 
in Utah Code Ann. § 7-1-18; 
e) They did not timely revoke Grove Finance's Articles of 
Incorporation as set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 7-1-26; 
5 
f) They did not timely take possession of Grove Finance's 
banking business even though the commissioners knew the 
banking business was unauthorized and unsafe. Utah Code 
Ann. § 7-2-1; and 
g) They did not periodically examine the loans, business and 
records of Grove Finance as required by Utah Code Ann. § 
70B-3-506(l). 
(R. 3, 4, 5, 6, 557, 559-60, 570-71.) 
In addition, the Commissioners did not require any employee, 
training or procedures manuals. The commissioners totally failed 
to implement any procedure that would assure that the statutory 
duties would be timely and adequately performed. (R. 7, 557, 558.) 
The depositors reasonably relied on the commissioners to 
perform their statutory responsibilities. (R. 5.) 
After several years of Grove Finance conducting an illegal 
banking business, Borthick, in response to a March 1980 telephone 
complaint, sent Gary R. Cox to examine Grove Finance. (R. 558; 
Borthick depo. p. 95; Cox depo. p. 38.) Cox examined the debenture 
records of Grove Finance. The debenture records had never before 
been examined by the commissioners. Cox's three hours of examin-
ation disclosed that Grove Finance had $8 million in debentures and 
only $2 million in loans. "It became very obvious that there was 
a problem . . . that liabilities exceeded assets. A loan is an 
asset, a debenture is a liability." (R. 558; Cox depo. p. 46.) 
6 
However, Borthick did not immediately act on the obvious 
problem. He waited over a month before issuing a cease and desist 
order requiring Grove Finance to stop its debenture deposit 
business. (R. 7, 558, 591.) 
Grove Finance ignored the cease and desist order and continued 
to sell debentures and accept deposits. (R. 7, 558.) The 
appellants continued to buy debentures and place their money on 
deposit with Grove Finance. (R. 559; Borthick depo. p. 104; Cox 
depo. pp. 71-72.) 
Three months after Borthick knew that Grove Finance's liabil-
ities were four times its assets, Borthick belatedly closed Grove 
Finance. (R. 559.) Grove Finance filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. 
These depositors lost the following amounts: 
Richard and Nancy Madsen $25,770.00 
Boyd and Beatrice Swensen 14,459.00 
Blaine and Sheree Anderson 4,199.05 
Hope Hilton 6,000.09 
Cynthia Hilton 13,838.44 
Ralph M. Hilton 1,900.37 
The Middle East Foundation $ 7,930.81 
(R. 7, 559-60; Plaintiff Supplemental Answers to Interrogatory No. 
12, April 5, 1990.) 
The depositors sued the State of Utah and the Commissioners 
in March of 1981. The district court dismissed the complaint. In 
Madsen v. Borthick, 658 P.2d 627 (Utah 1983) (hereinafter "Madsen 
X,f) , the Utah Supreme Court upheld the dismissal and ruled that the 
defendants were immune from suit in their official capacity and 
could only be sued in their personal capacity for gross negligence. 
7 
Subsequently, the named depositors, on behalf of themselves 
and all other 1250 similarly situated depositors, filed this action 
against the former commissioners alleging gross negligence. (R 2-
8.) The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the 
defendants. The ruling was reversed by the Utah Supreme Court in 
Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245 (Utah 1989) (hereinafter "Madsen 
II11) . Specifically, the Utah Supreme Court ruled that the 
depositors1 claims against Brimhall and Borthick are not barred by 
any statute of limitations nor governmental immunity. 
Brimhall petitioned this Court for a rehearing, and alleged 
that the statute of limitations barred the depositors1 claims 
against him. This court denied the petition for rehearing and 
remanded the case to the district court. (A copy of the Petition 
and Order are set forth in the Addendum.) On remand, the district 
court, contrary to the Madsen II opinion, granted Brimhall a 
summary judgment by ruling that the statute of limitations barred 
the depositors' claims. (R. 499-500.) 
Subsequently, the district court refused to certify this 
action as a class action even though the defendants did not contest 
that the Rule 23 requirements of numerosity, commonality, typical-
ity, superiority and adequate representation are all present in 
this litigation. (R. 277-291, 300-305, 401, 402, 407-412, 458-463, 
413,416, 468-488, 499-500.) 
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Thereafter, Borthick filed a Motion for Judgment on the 
Pleadings. For purposes of the motion, Borthick admitted that he 
was grossly negligent in performing the duties pled in the 
depositors' complaint but said that he had no duty to the 
depositors and that his errors were protected by common law good 
faith immunity. Contrary to Madsen II, the trial court ruled that 
the former commissioner had no duty to the depositors and granted 
the motion. (R. 55, 509-524, 554-602, 613-623, 640-642.) 
The depositors timely appealed (R. 653-658.) 
IX. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THIS COURT IN MADSEN II, RULED THAT NO 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS BARS THE 
DEPOSITORS' CLAIMS AGAINST BRIMHALL 
The Utah Supreme Court ruled in this litigation that no 
statute of limitations bars the depositors' claims against 
Brimhall. Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 254 (Utah 1988). This 
express ruling is the law of the case and is binding upon the 
parties, the trial court and this court. 
POINT II 
THE STATUTES OF LIMITATION, ADVOCATED BY BRIMHALL, 
DO NOT BAR THE DEPOSITORS1 CLAIMS AGAINST HIM 
The statutes of limitation advocated by Brimhall do not bar 
the depositors' claims because: (1) the statutes do not apply to 
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the depositors1 claims; (2) the Complaint filed against Brimhall 
relates back to the Complaint filed against Borthick; and (3) any 
applicable statute of limitations did not begin to run until the 
depositors suffered damages. 
POINT III 
THE COMMISSIONERS HAD A DUTY TO EXAMINE, INVESTIGATE 
AND SUPERVISE GROVE FINANCE, A SUPERVISED LENDER 
ENGAGED IN THE BANKING BUSINESS 
Title 7 and Title 70B of the Utah Code impose specific, 
mandatory and comprehensive duties upon the commissioners to 
examine, investigate and supervise Grove Finance. Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 7-1-7, 7-1-13, 7-1-14, 7-1-18, 7-1-27, 7-1-26, 7-10-7, 7-2-1 
(1979); Utah Code Ann. §§ 70B-6-103, 70B-3-506(1), 70B-3-503(2), 
70B-3-504, 70B-6-104(5), 70B-6-109, 70B-6-110 (1953, as amended). 
POINT IV 
THE STATUTORY DUTIES RUN TO THE DEPOSITORS 
The commissioners1 duties to examine, investigate and super-
vise Grove Finance, run to the depositors because: (1) Grove Fiance 
was under the supervision of the commissioners; (2) Grove Finance 
was licensed by the commissioners; and (3) The depositors are a 
group targeted for protection by Utah's statutory banking laws. 
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POINT V 
THE COMMISSIONERS CAN BE SUED PERSONALLY FOR GOVERN-
MENTAL ACTIONS WHEN THEY ARE GROSSLY NEGLIGENT 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-4 (Supp. 1979) as construed by Madsen 
II provides that these depositors can sue for the gross negligence 
committed by the commissioners. To apply a kind of "duty to all, 
duty to no one" doctrine contradicts both the legislative and 
judicial determinations that the depositors can sue the commis-
sioners personally for gross negligence. 
POINT VI 
ANY ALLEGED GOOD-FAITH OF THE COMMISSIONERS 
DOES NOT BAR THE DEPOSITORS' CLAIMS 
The common law defense of good faith qualified immunity does 
not bar the depositors1 claims because the defense is contrary to 
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. Further, the duties imposed 
upon the commissioners were mandatory not discretionary. 
POINT VII 
WHETHER THE COMMISSIONERS PERFORMED THEIR STATUTORY DUTIES 
HONESTLY AND IN GOOD FAITH ARE QUESTIONS OF FACT 
PRECLUDING A MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS 
The common law good faith defense only applies if: (1) duties 
are performed; (2) honestly; and (3) in good faith. Each of these 
elements is a question of fact requiring a trial. 
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POINT VIII 
RES JUDICATA PRECLUDES THE COMMISSIONERS FROM 
RAISING THE "DUTY TO ALL. DUTY TO NO ONE" DEFENSE 
The "duty to all, duty to no one" doctrine is an affirmative 
defense which could and should have been raised in Madsen I. Res 
judicata bars the commissioners from raising the defense in this 
litigation. 
POINT IX 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN FAILING 
TO CERTIFY THIS LITIGATION AS A CLASS ACTION 
The district court in denying class action certification, 
committed reversible error in failing to apply the criteria set 
forth in U.R.C.P. 23 and applying factors other than those set 
forth in U.R.C.P. 23, Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 
(1974) . 
POINT X 
THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR 
WHEN IT FAILED TO STATE ANY REASON 
FOR DENYING CLASS ACTION CERTIFICATION 
TO THIS LITIGATION 
It is reversible error not to state any reasons for denying 
class action certification. The failure to do so often makes it 
impossible to discern whether the lower court applied or misapplied 
Rule 23. 
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X. 
ARGUMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
The trial court granted Brimhall1s Motion for Summary Judgment 
solely on the basis that the statute of limitations barred the 
depositors' claims. The depositors submit that this ruling was 
contrary to the previous ruling of the Utah Supreme Court in this 
very case and that no statute of limitations advocated by Brimhall 
bars the depositors1 claims. 
The trial court granted Borthick's Motion for Judgment on the 
Pleadings by reasoning that the commissioners had no duty to the 
depositors and that the common law defense of good faith immunity 
bars the depositors1 claims. The ruling must be reversed for the 
following reasons: 
A. In a previous decision, this Court ruled that the depos-
itors can sue the commissioners for gross negligence. 
B. The commissioners had a duty to examine, investigate and 
supervise Grove Finance. 
C. The duty runs to the depositors. 
D. The "duty to all, duty to no one" doctrine is contrary to 
the Governmental Immunity Act and Madsen II. 
E. The "duty to all, duty to no one" doctrine and common law 
good faith immunity doctrine advocated by the commis-
sioners are defenses that could and should have been 
13 
brought in Madsen I and/or Madsen II and are barred by 
res judicata. 
F. The common law defense of good faith qualified immunity 
is contrary to the Governmental Immunity Act and does not 
apply to ministerial duties. 
G. Any issue of good faith involves questions of fact 
precluding a motion for judgment on the pleadings. 
Each of the foregoing points is briefed in this "Argument.11 
POINT I 
THIS COURT IN MADSEN II, RULED THAT 
NO STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS BARS THE DEPOSITORS1 
CLAIMS AGAINST BRIMHALL 
A. Factual Background. 
This is not the first appeal in this litigation to consider 
whether a statute of limitations bars the depositors1 claims 
against Brimhall. In Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245 (Utah 1988) 
("Madsen II"), at issue was whether any statute of limitations, 
i.e., Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-26(4), 28(1) or 29(2) barred the 
depositors' claims against Brimhall and Borthick. The Utah Supreme 
Court ruled that they did not: 
The [trial] court held . . . that the applic-
able statute of limitations bars this action. 
The investors challenge all of these legal 
conclusions. We agree with the investors that 
the trial court's ruling was incorrect and 
remand the matter for further proceeding. 
Madsen II p. 246. 
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* * * 
Finally, we consider the investors challenge 
to the last ground given by the trial court in 
support of the summary judgment—that the suit 
was time barred by any of three potentially 
applicable statutes of limitation, Section 78-
12-26-(4)-28(l) and 29(2) of the code. . . . 
[W]e conclude that under any of them, Section 
78-12-40 did extend the time for filing and 
that the investors commenced this action 
within the period of the extension . . . it 
was not time barred. 
Madsen II, pp. 253-254. 
Subsequently, Brimhall petitioned the Utah Supreme Court to 
reconsider the statutes of limitation issue. Brimhallfs petition 
for rehearing was denied. (See Addendum.) 
On remand, Brimhall filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. The 
sole argument for the motion was that the depositors' claims were 
barred either by Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-26(4), § 78-12-28(1) or § 
78-12-29(8) the identical issue ruled on by this Court in Madsen 
II. (R. 32-51.) 
The depositors informed the lower court that the statute of 
limitations issue was previously decided against Brimhall by the 
Utah Supreme Court in Madsen II. (R. 68-74; Transcript of 
Proceedings November 14, 1989 pp. 21, 24, 26.) The trial court 
ignored the Madsen II ruling and granted Brimhall's motion. 
B. Legal Analysis. 
An express ruling by the Utah Supreme Court on issues raised 
by a prior appeal is the law of the case and binding upon the 
parties, the trial court and any subsequent appellate court. 
Prudential Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. St. Paul Insurance Co., 
22 Utah 2d 70, 448 P.2d 724 (Utah 1985); Corbett v. Fitzgerald. 709 
P.2d 384 (Utah 1985); C & J Industries, Inc. v. Bailev. 669 P.2d 
855 (Utah 1983); Davis v. Payne & Day, Inc., 12 Utah 2d 107, 363 
P.2d 498 (1961). 
The issue in Madsen II was whether Sections 78-12-26(4), 28(4) 
or 29(8) barred the depositors1 claims against Brimhall and 
Borthick. This Court ruled that they did not. The ruling is not 
subject to further attack in a subsequent trial or a subsequent 
appeal. 
POINT II 
THE STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS, ADVOCATED BY BRIMHALL, 
DO NOT BAR THE DEPOSITORS' CLAIMS AGAINST HIM 
A. Factual Background. 
The Department took over and closed Grove Finance on July 18, 
1980. Grove Finance responded by filing a Chapter 11 bankruptcy. 
A trustee was appointed by the bankruptcy court to liquidate Grove 
Finance. The lower Court did not determine when the liquidation 
occurred nor its results. 
The depositors filed their first action against Mirvin D. 
Borthick and the Department on March 1, 1981. At that time, the 
depositors did not know who the identity of Borthick's predecessor. 
After Madsen I held that the former commissioners could only be 
sued in their personal capacities for gross negligence, the 
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depositors filed this action against Brimha^l and Borthick on July 
20, 1983. 
B. Legal Analysis. 
As set forth in Point I, Madsen II held that none of the 
statute of limitations argued by Brimhall to the lower court bars 
the depositors1 claims. There are numerous reasons why they do 
not. The reasons follow: 
1. Utah Code Ann. SS 78-12-26(4), 78-12-28(1), and 78-12-
29(2) are inapplicable. 
Section 78-12-28(1) creates a two year statute of limitations 
for claims against a marshall, sheriff, constable or other officer 
upon a liability incurred by the doing of an act in his official 
capacity. The depositors did not sue a marshall, a sheriff, a 
constable or any other officer in his official capacity. They are 
suing the former commissioners in their individual capacities. 
Section 78-12-29(2) provides for a one year period in which to 
sue for a statutory penalty or forfeiture where the action is given 
to an individual. The depositors are not sueing for a forfeiture 
or penalty so the statute does not apply. 
Section 78-12-26(4) is also inapplicable. In Matheson v. 
Pearson, 619 P.2d 321, 323 (Utah 1980), the Utah Supreme Court held 
that Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25(2), a four years statute of 
limitations is the correct statute for reckless conduct and all 
forms of negligence. 
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2. The complaint against Brimhall relates back to the 
complaint against Borthick. 
Brimhall, in his Madsen II brief before the Utah Supreme 
Court, emphasized that he was identical in interest to Borthick for 
statute of limitations purposes: 
Commissioner Borthick was a named defendant in 
the earlier case, and clearly a state official 
such as Commissioner Brimhall is in privity 
with the State, which was also a defendant in 
Madsen I, 
(Brimhallfs Brief in Madsen II p. 19.) 
Ordinarily, a party may not be added after the statute of 
limitations has run. But, this rule is subject to an exception 
where, as here, the timely sued defendant (Borthick) and the 
defendant added later (Brimhall) share an identity of interest. In 
these circumstances, the adding of the new defendant relates back 
to the filing of the original Complaint for statute of limitations 
purposes. 
The exception operates where there is a 
relation back, as to both plaintiff and 
defendant, when new and old parties have an 
identity of interest; so it can be assumed or 
proved the relation back is not prejudicial. 
Doxey-Layton Co. v. Clark, 548 P.2d 902, 906 (Utah 1976). 
Courts in other jurisdictions have held that where suit is 
timely commenced against a public officer, the plaintiff's 
subsequent naming of another officer holding the same office is not 
time barred, because the complaint relates back to the filing of 
the original complaint. e.g., Dougherty v. Payne, 291 F. 61 (5th 
18 
Cir. 1923); Carolina Bagging Co. v. United States R.R. 
Administration, 113 S.E. 595 (1922); Hines v. Chaddick, 63 S.W.2d 
263 (Tex. App. 1933). 
3. The statute of limitations does r^ ot begin to run until 
the depositors lost their money. 
Brimhall, in his motion for summary judgment in the lower 
court, assumed that the statute of limitations began to run when 
the commissioners closed Grove Finance. That assumption is 
incorrect. The depositors did not sue the commissioners for 
closing Grove Finance. They sued the commissioners for breaching 
the duties set forth in the Statement of Facts section of this 
brief. The closing of the business enterprise does not, in and of 
itself, cause the statute of limitations to begin to run. see, 
Kimball v. McCormick, 20 Utah 189, 259 P.2d 313 (1927). Instead, 
the statute begins to run when the cause of action accrues, e.g., 
Fredrickson v. Knight Land Co., 667 P.2d 34 (Utah 1983). The 
elements of a claim for gross negligence are: duty of care; a 
grossly negligent breach of the duty; causation; and damages. 
c.f., Williams v. Welbv, 699 P.2d 723, 726 (Utah 1985). 
A negligence action generally accrues when all the elements 
necessary to maintain the action are present and it is apparent 
that the plaintiff has been damaged. Samuelson v. Freeman, 454 
P.2d 406 (Wash. 1969). Damages, in this case, became apparent to 
the depositors when the bankruptcy trustee comoleted the 
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liquidation of Grove Finance. The lower court never determined 
when the liquidation occurred. 
4. The applicable statute of limitations is four years. 
Gross negligence or reckless conduct is a form of negligence 
subject to the four year statute of limitations set forth in Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-12-25(1). Matheson v. Pearson, 619 P.2d 321, 322 
(Utah 1980). 
In summary, the statute of limitations does not bar the 
depositors' claims against Brimhall, because: Madsen II ruled 
otherwise, the statutes relied upon by Brimhall are inapplicable; 
the complaint against Brimhall relates back to the Complaint filed 
against Borthick; and the statute did not begin to run until the 
depositors knew they were damaged. 
POINT III 
THE COMMISSIONERS HAD A DUTY TO EXAMINE, INVESTIGATE 
AND SUPERVISE GROVE FINANCE, A SUPERVISED LENDER 
ENGAGED IN THE BANKING BUSINESS 
Utah statutory law imposes upon the commissioners numerous 
comprehensive and specific duties to examine, investigate and 
supervise Grove Finance. The duties are set forth in both Title 7 
and Title 7OB of the Utah Code. The depositors pled each duty in 
their Complaint. (R. 2-8.) 
A. Duties Under Title 7. 
In 1985, the legislature repealed most of Title 7. Because 
Grove Finance conducted a banking business until its closure in 
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1980 all cites in this brief are to Title 7 as it existed in 1980, 
unless otherwise indicated. 
Grove Finance was licensed as a small loan business under 
Title 7 until 1969 and as a supervised lender thereafter. From 
1970 until its closure by Borthick in 1980, Grove Finance was a 
corporation doing a banking business: 
Any corporation holding itself out to the 
public as receiving money in deposit whether 
evidenced by a certificate, promissory note or 
otherwise, shall be considered as doing a 
banking business and shall be subject to the 
provisions of this chapter as to such 
business. 
Utah Code Ann. § 7-1-3. 
There is no genuine fact issue of whether Grove Finance 
conducted a banking business. (R. 556-559; Cox depo. p. 57; 
Stuart depo. p. 578.) In the addendum is a copy of a debenture 
ledger used by Grove Finance. The ledger clearly shows that money 
was periodically deposited and withdrawn at will by the depositors. 
In summary, because Grove Finance was doing a banking 
business, it was subject to the provisions of Title 7. Title 7 
creates numerous specific and comprehensive duties upon the commis-
sioners to examine, investigate and supervise Grove Finance. 
Section 7-1-7 provides: 
All banks, all loan and trust companies, all 
building and loan companies, all credit 
unions, all small loan business required to 
obtain a license under any provision of law, 
and all bank service companies shall be under 
the supervision of the banking department and 
shall be subject to examination by the bank 
commissioner. . . . 
Section 7-1-8 provides: 
The bank commissioner . . . shall visit and 
examine every bank, savings bank, every loan 
and trust corporation, every building and loan 
association, every industrial loan company, 
every small loan business, and every 
cooperative bank, at least once a year. At 
every such examination careful inquiry shall 
be made as to the condition and resources of 
each institution examined, the mode of 
conducting and managing its affairs, the 
official actions of its directors and 
officers, the investment and disposition of 
its funds, the security afforded to its 
members, if any, and to those by whom its 
engagements are held, whether or not it is 
violating any provisions of law relating to 
corporations or to the business of the 
institution examined, whether or not it is 
complying with its articles of incorporation 
and bylaws, and as to such other matters as 
the commissioner may prescribe. 
Section 7-1-13 imposes a mandatory duty to notify the board of 
directors of a banking business of any officer or employee found to 
be dishonest, reckless, incompetent or failing to perform the 
duties of his office. 
Section 7-1-14 imposes a mandatory duty to require, at least 
once a year, the board of directors of a banking business to 
examine its books and affairs with the special purpose of 
ascertaining the value and security thereof and to cause a report 
of that examination to be prepared for the commissioner. 
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Section 7-1-17 creates a mandatory duty to call for not less 
than four reports a year of the condition of each banking business 
such as Grove Finance and to certify the report for publication. 
Section 7-1-18 gives the commissioner the power to call for 
special reports from any banking business when necessary. 
Section 7-1-27 creates a mandatory duty to inform the county 
attorney of any violation of the law by an officer, director or 
employee of a banking business. 
Section 7-1-26 give the commissioner the power to refuse to 
grant approval for the filing of articles of incorporation of any 
banking business which does not comply with the law of the state. 
Section 7-10-7 provides the commissioners the power to revoke 
or suspend the license of a banking business which has violated any 
provision of Title 7. 
Section 7-2-1 grants the commissioners the power to take 
possession of the business and property of any banking business 
which is conducting its business in an unauthorized or unsafe 
manner. 
The foregoing powers and duties are not discretionary. The 
word "shall" imposes a mandatory duty. Herr v. Salt Lake County, 
525 P.2d 728, 729 (Utah 1974). Further, the Utah Supreme Court in 
Tripp v. District Court of the Third Judicial District, 89 Utah 8, 
56 P.2d 1355, 1359 (1936), ruled that Title 7 imposes mandatory 
duties upon the commissioners: 
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Once each year it is made his duty to examine 
certain institutions. The public has such 
interest in the maintenance of such institu-
tions that the examiner is required to make 
careful inquiry into the conditions and 
resources of the institution. . . . 
Id. at 1359. 
In summary, Title 7 imposed specific mandatory duties upon the 
commissioners to examine, and supervise Grove Finance. 
B. Title 70B. 
In 1969, Utah adopted the Utah Uniform Consumer Credit Code as 
Title 70B of the Utah Code. The commissioners were the admini-
stratorss of Title 70B. (Utah Code Ann. § 70B-6-103) . As 
Administrators of Title 70B, the commissioners had specific 
mandatory duties to examine, investigate and supervise Grove 
Finance. 
Utah Code Ann. § 70B-3-506(l) reads as follows: 
(1) The administrator shall examine period-
ically at intervals he deems appropriate 
the loans, business and records of every 
licensee. In addition, for the purpose 
of discovering violations of this act or 
securing information lawfully required, 
the administrator or the official or 
agency to whose supervision the organi-
zation is subject (section 70B-6-105) may 
at any time investigate the loans, 
business, and records of any regulated 
lender. For these purposes he shall have 
free and reasonable access to the 
offices, places of business, and records 
of the lender. (Emphasis added.) 
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To aid in the examination, subsection (3} of § 70B-3-506 gave 
the commissioners subpoena power to require the production of 
materials relevant to an investigation, including "any books, 
documents or other tangible things." 
Utah Code Ann. § 70B-3-503(2) states: 
(2) No license shall be issued unless the 
administrator, upon investigation, finds 
that the financial responsibility, 
character and fitness of the applicant, 
and of the members thereof (if the appli-
cant is a copartnership or association) 
and of the officers and directors thereof 
(if the applicant is a corporation), are 
such as to warrant belief that the 
business will be operated honestly and 
fairly within the purposes of this act. 
Utah Code Ann. § 70B-3-504 provided th^t: 
The administrator shall revoke or suspend the 
license [of any licensee] if he finds that: 
(a) the licensee has repeatedly and willfully 
violated this act or any rule or order 
lawfully made pursuant to this act; or 
(b) facts or conditions exist which would 
clearly have justified the administrator 
in refusing to grant a license had these 
facts or conditions been kno^n to exist 
at the time the application for the 
license was made. (Emphasis added.) 
Utah Code Ann. § 70B-6-104(5) required the defendants1 to 
issue a report on the results of the Commissioners examination and 
supervision: 
[T]he report shall include a description of 
the examination and investigation procedures 
and policies of his office. . . . 
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The commissioners also had the statutory authority to issue 
cease and desist orders and to bring civil actions to "restrain a 
person from violating this act and for other appropriate relief,11 
Utah Code Ann, § 70B-6-109, 110. 
POINT IV 
THE DUTIES RUN TO THE DEPOSITORS 
A duty to control the conduct of third persons occurs if "a 
special relation exists between the defendant [commissioners] and 
the third person [Grove Finance] which imposes a duty upon the 
defendant to control the third person's conduct or [if] a special 
relation exists between the defendant [commissioners] and the 
plaintiff [depositors]." Owens v. Garfield, 784 P.2d 1187, 1189 
(Utah 1989). 
In this case, both relationships exist. 
A. The Relationship Between the Commissioners and Grove Finance 
Requires that the Statutory Duties Run to the Depositors. 
In Owens v. Garfield, 784 P.2d 1187, 1189 (Utah 1989) the Utah 
Supreme Court ruled that whether "a sufficiently close relationship 
in a legal sense" exists between the State and a third person 
depends upon whether the third person is under the supervision of 
or licensed by the State. In Owens, the court held that the State 
did not have a duty to control a child care provider because she 
was not licensed nor supervised. 
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[P]laintiffs do not attempt to construct, an 
argument that defendants had a Sufficiently 
close relationship in a legal sense with 
Garfield to give rise to a duty to control her 
activities. Although both the DFS and the 
County had been investigating Garfield. . . 
she was not required to be licensed by the 
State to be a day-care provider. 
* * * 
Garfield was not included in the class of day-
care providers required to be licensed under 
the Utah day-care licensing laws. Because 
this case does not involve a licensed day-care 
provider, no duty can be predicated on the 
licensing provisions. 
Owens, at 1189, 1190. 
In this case, as set forth in Point III of the brief, Grove 
Finance was under the direct supervision of the commissioners and 
Grove Finance was licensed by them. Therefore, the legal 
relationship exists between the commissioners and Grove Finance 
which imposes upon the commissioners the duty to examine, 
investigate and supervise Grove Finance foif the benefit of the 
depositors. 
B. Utah's Statutory Banking Laws Require the Commissioners1 
Duties to Run to the D e p o s i t o r s . I 
When a statute evidences a clear intent to identify and 
protect a particular class of persons, a negligence or gross 
negligence tort action may be brought for the violation of the 
statute. As explained in Baerlein v. State, 92 Wash.2d 229, 595 
P.2d 930, 932 (1979): 
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Obviously a statute which by its terms creates 
a duty to individuals can be the basis for a 
negligence action where the statute is vio-
lated and the injured plaintiff was one of the 
persons designed to be protected by the 
legislation. A clear statement of legislative 
intent to protect individuals does not need an 
"exception" to the traditional rule; it is 
simply a statutory duty imposed on the 
governmental entity . . . if . . . the legis-
lation evidences a clear intent to identify a 
particular and circumscribed class of persons, 
such person may bring an action in tort for 
violation of the statute or ordinance. 
Similarly, in Halverson v. Dahl, 89 Wash.2d 673, 574 P.2d 1190 
(1978), the Washington Supreme Court stated: 
Liability can be founded upon a . . . code if 
that code by its terms evidences a clear 
intent to identify and protect a particular 
and circumscribed class of persons. 
The special nature of the . . . code is found 
. . . in the declaration of purpose. 
Id. at 1192-93. 
The question of whether a statute which evidences an intent to 
protect a particular class of persons,imposes a duty for the 
benefit of the protected class, was conclusively decided by this 
Court in Little v. Utah State Division of Family Services, 667 P. 2d 
49 (Utah 1983). In Little, the plaintiffs brought a wrongful death 
claim against the State for the death of their autistic infant 
daughter. The plaintiffs claimed that the State was negligent for 
failing to evaluate the foster home in which the infant was placed; 
failing to supervise the infant's placement; and failing to protect 
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the infant from harm. In affirming judgment against the State, the 
Utah Supreme Court held: 
The statute specifically includes a duty to 
protect the child . . . we therefore hold that 
the protection of law well extended to the 
interests the plaintiffs here seek to vindi-
cate. 
Id. at 54. 
The depositors, in this case, claim that they have been 
damaged by the commissioners1 gross negligence in failing to 
discharge the duties set forth in Title 7 and, alternatively, in 
Title 7OB. Both of those statutes evidence a clear intent to 
protect a "particular and circumscribed clas$ of persons" of which 
these plaintiffs are members. As such, the ^uties set forth in 
Title 7 and Title 70B run to the depositors. 
Utah Code Ann. § 7-1-102 explains the legislative findings, 
intent and purposes of Title 7. Subsection (1) (b) states that one 
of the purposes of Title 7 is "to protect the depositors, customers 
and shareholders of depository institutions paving their principle 
place of business in this state." 
Utah Code Ann. § 7-1-301 further identifies the depositors as 
a group to be protected by Title 7. Under Section 7-1-301 the 
commissioner is given specific authority to issue rules "to 
safeguard the interests of shareholders, members, depositors, and 
other customers of institutions and other persons subject to the 
jurisdiction of the department." (Emphasis ac^ ded.) 
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Similarly, the Legislature, in adapting Title 70B of Utah Code 
Annotated, also targeted the depositors for protection. Utah Code 
Ann. § 70B-6-103 provided that the Administrators of Title 70B are 
the Commissioners. Utah Code Ann. § 70B-1-102 outlined the 
purposes of the statute. One purpose is to protect those who have 
business dealings with supervised lenders. 
Other courts have determined that banking statutes similar to 
Utah's are intended to protect the depositors. These Courts ruled 
that the statutory duties run to the depositors and allow the 
depositors to pursue their claims against governmental entities and 
their employees. Examples follow: 
In State v. Superior Court of Maricopa County, 123 Ariz. 324, 
599 P.2d 777 (1979), a class of depositors brought an action 
against the Arizona Corporation Commission, and employees. 
Specifically, the depositors charged negligence in failing to make 
yearly examinations of the thrifts, failing to examine according to 
required standards, and failing to properly supervise and regulate 
the affairs of the thrifts. 
The Commission, like the commissioners in this case, asserted 
that it's duty was "one owed to the public generally, and a breach 
of this duty does not provide an individual with a cause of 
action." Id. at 785. The Court examined the Commission's 
statutory duties and determined that the statutory language 
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"narrows the Corporation Commission's duty fnto a duty to protect 
the injured depositors," id. at 785. 
The duties listed in the Arizona statute are nearly identical 
to the commissioners' duties in this case. After citing those 
duties, the Arizona Supreme Court stated: 
To hold that article 17 does not create a duty 
that extends from the Corporatiori Commission 
to the individual depositor would be to render 
the article meaningless. 
Id. at 786. 
Another factually similar case is Tch^repnin v. Franz, 570 
F.2d 187 (7th Cir. 1978). In that case, the Seventh Circuit Court 
of Appeals held that a state official's statlutory duty to examine 
and regulate state-chartered savings and loan associations was 
enforceable by the injured depositors. After reviewing the 
statutory duties, again, similar to the statutory duties of the 
commissioners in this case, the court held: 
[W]e find nothing in the Illinois Savings and 
Loan Act to suggest that Knight [Financial 
Institutions Director] was charged with 
responsibilities only to the State of 
Illinois. On the contrary, the Act . 
indicates that the Association - and, more 
specifically, its depositors - haVe a vested 
right in the duties therein prescribed. 
Id. at 191. 
In summary, the duties set forth in Point III of this brief 
run to the depositors. The depositors are entitled to move forward 
on their claims because they were targeted ror protection by both 
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Title 7 and Title 7OB and because Grove Finance was supervised and 
licensed by the commissioners. Otherwise, this Court in Madsen II 
could not have ruled, as it did, that the depositors may sue the 
commissioners for their gross negligence. 
POINT V 
THE COMMISSIONERS CAN BE SUED PERSONALLY FOR GOVERN-
MENTAL ACTIONS WHEN THEY ARE GROSSLY NEGLIGENT 
A. Procedural Background. 
In ruling that the commissioners owed no duty to the 
depositors, the lower court accepted the "duty to all, duty to no 
one" doctrine. 
[B]orthick, in the discharge of his statutory 
duty and responsibilities as the former 
commissioner of the Department of Financial 
Institutions owed no duty of care to 
plaintiffs individually. . . . (R. 500). 
B. Legal Analysis. 
1. Introduction. 
Application of "duty to all, duty to no one" doctrine in this 
case is contrary to the Utah Governmental Immunity Act and this 
court's ruling in Madsen II. In addition, the doctrine does not 
apply to individuals. In short, the commissioners can be sued 
personally for their governmental acts of gross negligence. 
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2. The "duty to all, duty to no one" doctrine conflicts with 
the governmental immunity act and Madsen II, 
The common law "duty to all, duty to no one" doctrine directly 
conflicts with the Utah Governmental Immunity Act as it existed 
when the depositors1 claims arose. Of course, a common law 
doctrine contrary to legislation is of no force or effect. e.g., 
Drennan v. Security Pacific National Bank, 621 P.2d 1318 (Cal. 
1981); Board of County Commissioners of Nepsho County v. Central 
Air Conditioning Co., 683 P.2d 1282 (Kansas 1984). 
In 1980, when the depositors' claims a^rose, the Utah Govern-
mental Immunity Act provided that governmental employees were 
personally liable for errors or omissions occurring during the 
performance of their duties if the employee acted with gross 
negligence. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-4 (Supp^ 1979). 
In Madsen II, this Court specifically |held that the commis-
sioners were not immune from liability to th4 depositors for gross 
negligence committed in their individual capacities. The 
depositors could sue on their claims. To now conclude that the 
commissioners are immune from suit is contrary to the judicial 
(Madsen II) determination that the commissioners are liable to the 
depositors for gross negligence. 
It also amounts to nothing more than th^ improper repeal of a 
legislative act. In Brennen v. Eugene. 285 Or. 401, 591 P.2d 719 
(1979) the Oregon Supreme Court explained: 
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[W]e conclude . . • that any distinction 
between "public" and "private" duty is 
precluded by statute in this State, [citing 
Oregon's Governmental Immunity Act]. . . . In 
abolishing governmental tort immunity, the 
Legislature specifically provided for certain 
exceptions under which immunity would be 
retained (citation omitted), and we find no 
warrant for judicially engrafting an 
additional exception onto the statute. 
Id. at 725. 
In summary, the Utah Supreme Court must consider the law as it 
existed at the time the depositors1 claims arose. At that time, 
government officials, including the commissioners, were personally 
liable and not immune from suit for gross negligence. A common law 
duty doctrine, like the "duty to all, duty to no one" doctrine, 
cannot recreate governmental immunity when the Legislature has 
abolished it. Adams v. State, 555 P.2d 235 (Alaska 1976). 
3. The "duty to all, duty to no one" doctrine does not apply 
to officials sued in their individual capacity. 
The "duty to all, duty to no one" doctrine provides that in 
order for an injured person to recover against a municipality, he 
must show a breach of duty owed to the plaintiff as an individual 
and not merely the breach of an obligation owed to the general 
public. Owens. supra at 1189 n. 2.; However, the depositors are 
not suing a municipality or any other governmental entity. The 
commissioners are being sued as individuals. For that reason, 
District Judge Timothy Hansen, in related litigation, twice 
rejected the commissioners "duty to all, duty to no one" argument. 
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Hilton v. Borthick. Civil No. C82-3798. |ee; Exhibit D in the 
Addendum. 
4. The governmental immunity act requires, these defendants 
to be treated like any other individual defendants. 
Even if the "duty to all, duty to no on£" doctrine applies to 
individuals, and it does not, the Utah Governmental Immunity Act 
abrogated the doctrine. 
Section 63-30-4 of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, as it 
existed in 1980 and now, provides: 
Wherein immunity from suit is waived by this 
act, consent to be sued is granted and liabil-
ity of the entity shall be determined as if 
the entity were a private person. (Emphasis 
added.) 
In Madsen_II, this Court ruled that the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act waived immunity on claims for gross negligence. 
Liability must, therefore, be determiried as though the 
commissioners are private persons. 
i 
If the commissioners1 liability is determined as that of a 
private person, the "duty to all, duty to no one" doctrine is 
inapplicable. As explained by the Alaska Supreme Court in Adams v. 
State, 555 P.2d 235 (Alaska 1976): 
Thus, if the defendant fState] were considered 
a private entity, its duty to the plaintiffs 
or their decedents would be clear. 
* * * 
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An application of the public duty doctrine 
here would result in finding no duty owed to 
the plaintiffs or their decedents by the 
State, because although they were foreseeable 
victims and a private defendant would have 
owed such a duty, no "special relationship" 
between the parties existed. Why should the 
establishment of duty become more difficult 
when the State is the defendant? Where there 
is no immunity, the State is to be treated 
like a private litigant. To allow the public 
duty doctrine to disturb this equality would 
create immunity where the legislature has not. 
(Emphasis added). 
Id. at 241-42. 
In summary, the Utah Government Immunity Act waived immunity 
for governmental employees1 gross negligence and requires that 
their duties and liability be determined in the same fashion as 
that of other individuals. 
POINT VI 
ANY ALLEGED GOOD-FAITH OF THE COMMISSIONERS 
DOES NOT BAR THE DEPOSITORS' CLAIMS 
A. The Common Law Concept of Good-Faith Qualified Immunity is 
Contrary to the Governmental Immunity Act. 
As discussed in Points III, IV and V of this brief, the Utah 
Legislature has specifically waived immunity on this claim for 
gross negligence against the commissioners. (Madsen II) . The 
good-faith qualified immunity doctrine is contrary to a claim for 
gross negligence. The Utah Supreme Court explained the reason for 
the doctrine: 
36 
It would be quite impractical and unfair to 
require them [public officials] to act at 
their own risk. This would not only be dis-
ruptive of the proper functioning of public 
institutions, but undoubtedly would dissuade 
competent and responsible persons from accept-
ing the responsibilities of public office. 
Anderson v. Granite School District, 17 Utah 2d 405, 407, 413 P.2d 
597 (1966). 
That reasoning falls apart when, as here, the Legislature has 
specifically authorized actions against public officials for gross 
negligence. The Legislature has clearly determined that there is 
no good-faith qualified immunity in an action for gross negligence. 
B. Good-faith Qualified Immunity Does Not Apply Because the 
Duties and Powers Provided in Utah's Banking Statutes are not 
Discretionary. 
Good-faith qualified immunity applies when an official is 
performing a discretionary function. Utah State University v. 
Sutro & Co., 646 P.2d 715, 721 (Utah 1982). Qualified immunity 
does not apply to a public official's performance of ministerial 
duties. Ministerial duties include those which are mandatory and 
imperative, the performance of which leaves nothing for judgment or 
discretion, e.g. , Tcherepnin v. Franz. 570 F.2d 187, 191 (7th Cir. 
1987) . 
As discussed in Point III of this brief, the commissioner's 
duties to examine and supervise Grove Finance were not discretion-
ary, but mandatory and ministerial. Thus, good-faith qualified 
immunity does not apply to this case. In State ex rel. Funk v. 
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Turner, 42 S.W.2d 594 (Mo. 1931), the Missouri Supreme Court looked 
at the statutory duty to examine and said: 
The difficulty arises in a classification of 
the duties of a bank examiner, whether discre-
tionary or ministerial. To resolve this 
question we must refer to Section 11689 R.S. 
Mo. 1919. This section makes it mandatory 
that every bank be examined at least once a 
year. . . . On every such examination inquiry 
shall be made as to the condition and resour-
ces of such corporation or banker, the mode of 
conducting and managing its affairs . . . the 
investment of its funds, and safety and 
prudence of its management, the security 
afforded to those by whom its engagements are 
held. . . . 
By the provisions of this section, the 
commissioner must make at least one 
examination each year. This duty is not a 
discretionary one, but it is ministerial; 
he has no alternative or choice in the matter. 
. . . We are also of the opinion that this 
section makes it the mandatory duty of the 
officer who conducts the investigation, to 
inquire into the various matters set out in 
the statute. Since it is mandatory it becomes 
a ministerial duty. . . . 
Id. at 598. 
The language of the Missouri statute is almost word for word 
identical to Title 7 as it existed in 1980. For example, Utah Code 
Ann. § 70B-3-506 provided that: 
The administrator shall examine periodically 
at intervals he deems appropriate the loans, 
business and records of each licensee. 
The duty to examine is mandatory and, therefore, ministerial 
and not protected by the doctrine of good-faith qualified immunity. 
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POINT VII 
WHETHER THE COMMISSIONERS PERFORMED THEIR STATUTORY 
DUTIES HONESTLY AND IN GOOD FAITH ARE QUESTIONS 
OF FACT PRECLUDING A MOTION FOR JUDGMENT 
ON THE PLEADINGS 
The common law defense of good-faith qualified immunity 
applies when the defendants perform their statutory duties honestly 
and good faith. e.g. , Hiorth v. Whittenburcr, 241 P.2d 907 (Utah 
1952)• Whether the commissioners: (1) performed their duties (2) 
honestly, and (3) in good faith are all questions of fact. see. 
Smith v. Losee, 485 F.2d 334, 345 (10th Cir. 1973). In the lower 
court there was no factual showing that the duties were performed 
nor that they were performed honestly and in good faith. A trial 
is necessary to resolve the factual questions. 
POINT VIII 
RES JUDICATA PRECLUDES THE COMMISSIONERS FROM 
RAISING THE "DUTY TO ALL, DUTY TO NO ONE11 DEFENSE 
A. Factual Background. 
This litigation is not the first litigation to occur between 
the parties. As set forth in the Statement of Facts section of 
this Brief, the depositors commenced the litigation by suing the 
State Department of Financial Institutions and the commissioners in 
their official capacity. The depositors alleged that the Depart-
ment and the commissioners, in their official capacity, negligently 
failed to perform their statutory duties. In "Madsen I", this 
Court ruled that the State and the defendants, in their official 
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capacity, were immune from the depositors1 claims. In the Madsen 
I litigation, the defendants did not raise the "duty to all, duty 
to no one" defense. 
B. Legal Analysis. 
The protection offered by the Governmental Immunity statute is 
an affirmative defense which may be waived, see. Bowman v. Ogden, 
93 P. 561 (Utah 1908). The "duty to all, duty to no one" or the 
"public duty defense" is in reality only a form of the governmental 
immunity defense. As explained by the Arizona Court of Appeals in 
Bill Moore Motor Homes, Inc. v. State, 629 P.2d 1024, 1029 n. 4 
(1981) : 
In our view, the dichotomy of public versus 
private duty has created more problems that it 
has solved . . . [w]e think that the public-
private duty dichotomy is a shield very much 
like the shield of governmental immunity.... 
It makes no difference whether we call the 
remaining shield "no duty" or governmental 
immunity. 
Res judicata contains two branches, claims preclusion and 
issue preclusion, e.g., Penrod v. Nu Creation Creme Inc., 669 P.2d 
873 (Utah 1983); Swainston v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 766 
P.2d 1059 (1988). Claims preclusion prevents re-litigation of 
claims that could and should have been litigated in the prior 
action but were not. Penrod, supra; Swainston, supra. The issue 
in this case is whether the affirmative defense of a "duty to all, 
duty to no one" doctrine should be treated as a claim. 
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A claim is "the aggregate of operative facts which gives rise 
to a right enforceable in the courts." It provides the right to 
seek judicial interference. A claim petitions the court to award 
a remedy. A claim is resolved by a judicial pronouncement 
providing the requested remedy. Swainston v. Intermountain Health 
Care, Inc. , 766 P.2d 1059, 1061 (Utah 1988). Similarly, an 
affirmative defense does not require a finding of fact. Instead, 
an affirmative defense requests a judicial pronouncement denying 
the requested remedy. For these reasons, and others, courts which 
have considered the issue ruled that res judicata bars not only 
claims that should have been raised in the prior proceeding but 
also affirmative defenses, e.g., Americana Fabrics, Inc. v. L & L 
Textiles, Inc., 754 F.2d 1524 (9th Cir. 1985); Southmark Properties 
v. Charles House Corp., 742 F.2d 862 (8th Cir. 1984); Lundberg v. 
Stinson, 695 P.2d 328 (Hawaii App. 1985); Sciarrone v. Life 
Insurance Co. of Virginia, 313 S.E.2d 322 (S.C. App. 1984). 
In summary, the "duty to all, duty to no one" doctrine is an 
affirmative defense applicable to governmental entities. The 
defense could and should have been raised in Madsen I. Res 
judicata bars the defense from being raised in this action. 
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POINT IX 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN FAILING 
TO CERTIFY THE LITIGATION AS A CLASS ACTION 
A. Factual Background. 
Early in the litigation, the depositors filed two motions to 
certify the litigation as a class action. The grounds for the 
motions were: 
1. Collateral estoppel requires this case to be certified as 
a class action. 
2. The case meets the numerosity, commonality, typicality 
and adequate representation requirements of Rule 23(a) 
and the superiority required by Rule 23(b). 
(R. 142-158, 401-402, 407-412, 468-488.) 
In opposing the motion, the commissioners did not argue that 
this action does not meets the criteria set forth in U.R.C.P. 23. 
Instead the commissioners said: 
1. The depositors are seeking to consolidate this case with 
Hilton v. Borthick. 
2. The statute of limitations bars the unnamed depositors1 
claims so a class action should be denied. 
3. Res judicata bars any potential class from suing the 
commissioners for gross negligence. 
(R. 277-291, 413-446, 458-463.) 
The court, without explanation, denied both motions for class 
certification. (R. 499-500.) 
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B. Legal Analysis, 
1. The only criteria to be used in determining whether 
litigation should be certified as a class action is set 
forth in U.R.C.P. 23. 
The criteria for determining whether an action should be 
maintained as a class action is set forth in U.R.C.P. 23. 
It is the duty of the district court to apply 
carefully the criteria set forth in Rule 23(a) 
and (b) to the facts of the case to determine 
whether an action may be maintained as a class 
action. (Citation omitted.) If the criteria 
of Rule 23 is complied with, it is within the 
sound discretion of the district court to 
determine whether a suit . . . should proceed 
as a class action. 
Richardson v. Arizona Fuels Corp., 614 P.2d 636, 639 (Utah 1980). 
None of the Commissioner's arguments moved to the lower Court 
have anything to do with the elements set forth in U.R.C.P. 23. 
Reasons two and three are arguments which go to the merits of the 
litigation. The question of whether it is proper for a lower court 
to make a preliminary determination on the merits of the litigation 
prior to ruling on certification of the class was conclusively 
decided in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacguelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974).] 
The United States Supreme Court ruled that the question of class 
certification must be treated entirely independent of the merits of 
the litigation. The Court explained: 
^isen v. Carlisle was cited in Holmgren v. Utah-Idaho Sugar 
Co. , 582 P. 2d 856, 860 n. 3 (1978) with approval as properly 
construing the identical Federal Rule 23. 
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We find nothing in either the language or 
history of Rule 2 3 that gives a court any 
authority to conduct a preliminary inquiry 
into the merits of a suit in order to 
determine whether it may be maintained as a 
class action. Indeed, such a procedure 
contravenes the Rule by allowing a represen-
tative plaintiff to secure the benefits of a 
class action without first satisfying the 
requirements for it. . . . This procedure is 
directly contrary to the command of subdivis-
ion (c)(1) that the court determine whether a 
suit denominated a class action may be 
maintained as such as soon as practicable 
after the commencement of the action. . . . In 
determining the propriety of a class action, 
the question is not whether the plaintiff or 
plaintiffs have stated a cause of action or 
will prevail on the merits but rather whether 
the requirements of Rule 2 3 are met. 
Risen, at 177-78. 
2. It was reversible error for the court to consider legal 
issues other than the criteria of Rule 23. 
If the denial of class certification was 
influenced by the court's preliminary 
evaluation of the merits . . . the court 
committed error. [Njothing in either the 
language or history of Rule 23 . . . gives the 
court any authority to conclude a preclusion-
ary inquiry into the merits of a suit in order 
to determine whether it may be maintained as a 
class action. 
Anderson v. City of Albuquerque, 690 F.2d 796, 799 (11th Cir. 
1982). see, Call v. West Jordan, 727 P.2d 180, 183 (Utah 1986). 
(We will reverse a trial court's decision on class action status 
when it is shown that the trial court misapplied the law.) 
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3. This litigation meets the criteria set forth in Rule 23. 
Rule 2 3 contains five requirements: numerosity, commonality, 
typicality, adequate representation and superiority. This liti-
gation meets each requirement. 
This case satisfies Rule 23(a) (1) on numerosity. Rule 23(a) (1) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides: 
One or more members of a class may sue or be 
sued as representative parties . . . only if 
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of 
all members is impracticable. 
Grove Finance had approximately 1250 depositors or customers 
when it became insolvent. There is no serious question that the 
numerosity requirement is satisfied. 
This case satisfies Rule 23(a)(2) on commonality. Rule 
23(a)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that: 
One or more members of a class may sue or be 
sued as representative parties on behalf of 
all only if . . . (2) There are questions of 
law or fact common to the class. 
In this case, common questions abound. For example, whether 
or not defendants were grossly negligent is a question common to 
each depositor as are all the elements in the gross negligence 
claim. 
This case satisfies Rule 23(a)(3) on typicality. Rule 23(a)(3) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states? 
One or more members of a class may sue or be 
sued as representative parties on behalf of 
all only if . . . (3) the claims or defenses 
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of the representative party are typical of the 
claims or defenses of the class. 
In this case, the claims of Madsen, Swensen, Anderson, Hilton, 
Helland and The Middle East Foundation are typical of the claims of 
all other depositors because they all lost money when Grove Finance 
became defunct. 
This case satisfies the requirements of Rule 23(a)(4) with 
respect to adequate representation. Rule 23(a)(4) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure state that: 
One or more members of a class may sue or be 
sued as representative parties on behalf of 
all only if . . . (4) the representative party 
will fairly and adequately protect the 
interests of the class. 
In this case, Madsen, Swensen, Anderson, Hilton, Helland and The 
Middle East Foundation have demonstrated that they will adequately 
protect the interests of the class in that they have employed 
experienced counsel and the case has been vigorously pursued. 
This case satisfies the requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) on 
superiority. Rule 23(b)(3) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides that: 
An action may be maintained as a class action 
if . . . the court finds that the questions of 
law or facts common to the members of the 
class predominate over any questions affecting 
only individual members, and that a class 
action is superior to other available methods 
for the fair and efficient adjudication of the 
controversy. 
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Here, the class action is not only superior, it is probably 
the only method available for the adjudication of this controversy. 
The alternative, it would seem, would be for a thousand or so 
individuals to file individual lawsuits. 
In summary, there is absolutely no question that the require-
ments of Rule 23 are met in this litigation. For that reason, the 
commissioners never contested the Rule 23 requirements in the lower 
court. 
4. Collateral estoppel requires that this action be 
certified as a class action. 
The bankruptcy of Grove Finance sponsored several overlapping 
lawsuits. A companion case is Hilton v. Borthick, Civil No. C82-
5165, C82-5877 and C82-5198 an action brought by the depositors 
against commissioner Borthick on a negligence theory. Third 
Judicial District Court Judge Philip Fishier certified the com-
panion case as a class action. See Exhibit E of the Addendum. In 
order to certify the class, the trial court should have considered 
the factual touchstones in Rule 23. 
A fact issue established in a prior action, will be binding in 
a subsequent action if: 
1. The fact issue decided in the prior adjudication is 
identical with the fact issue presented in the second 
action. 
2. There was a final judgment on the merits. 
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3. The parties are the same in both actions (or in privity) . 
4. The fact issue was fairly litigated in the first action. 
Searle Bros, v. Searle, 588 P.2d 689 (Utah 1978). 
Each of the above requirements has been met. Indeed, the 
commissioners did not even argue that the requirements of 
collateral estoppel have not been met. 
5. The statute of limitations does not bar the claim of the 
unnamed depositors. 
Even if it was proper for the trial court to consider whether 
a statute of limitations barred the unnamed depositors' claims, and 
it was not the statute of limitations does not preclude a class 
action because it does not bar the claims. 
Madsen II held that the named depositors timely commenced this 
class action. Madsen II at 245, 254. The filing of a class action 
completely tolls the statute of limitations for all asserted 
members of the class until a final ruling on class action status. 
American Pipe and Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 (1974); 
Crown Cork and Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345 (1983). The 
statute of limitations will not begin to run until this Court rules 
on the class action issue. 
6. The depositors do not seek to consolidate this case with 
Hilton v. Borthick. 
In the lower court, the commissioners, without any explan-
ation, asserted that class action status should be denied because 
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the depositors were seeking to consolidate this case with Hilton v. 
Borthick. Whether or not the depositors seek to consolidate a case 
is not part of the Rule 2 3 criteria and should not have been 
considered by the lower court. Nevertheless, the depositors did 
not seek to consolidate any case. In Hilton, the case was 
dismissed because the trial court ruled that the negligent acts of 
the commissioners were protected by governmental immunity. In 
contrast, this is an action for gross negligence not protected by 
governmental immunity. The depositors do not seek a consolidation 
of cases. 
POINT X 
THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT FAILED 
TO STATE ANY REASONS FOR DENYING CLASS ACTION 
CERTIFICATION TO THIS LITIGATION 
As set forth in Point IX, it is reversible error for a lower 
court not to apply Rule 2 3 or to apply any other criteria but that 
found in Rule 23, in deciding whether the litigaiton should be 
certified as a class action. However, it is also reversible error 
for the court, as in this case, not to state its reasons for 
denying class certification. Without a statement, it is often 
impossible to discern whether the court applied or misapplied Rule 
23. Fink v. National Savings & Trust Co. , 772 F.2d 951, 960-61 
(D.C. Cir. 1985). 
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XI. 
CONCLUSION 
Neither a statute of limitations, the "duty to all, duty to no 
one" doctrine nor common law defense of good faith qualified 
immunity justify the court's entry of a summary judgment and 
judgment on the pleadings dismissing the depositors1 claims for 
gross negligence against the commissioners. In summary, the 
depositors can sue the Commissioners for their gross negligence. 
The lower court failed to apply U.R.C.P. 23 in deciding not to 
certify this litigation as a class action and the court failed to 
state any reason for denying class action certification. 
For these reasons, the orders of the lower court should be 
reversed, this litigation certified as a class action and remanded 
for trial. 
DATED this ^/^ Q day of December, 1990. • 2 ^ 
LIS
 / ^ Q day ol 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
50 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that four true and correct copies of the foregoing 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF (Madsen v. Borthick) ^ ras mailed, postage prepaid, 
on the J-Su day of December, 1990, to the following: 
R. Paul Van Dam 
John Soltis 
Reed M. Stringham 
Utah State Attorney General's Office 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
SP7-060.1\jn 
51 
ADDENDUM 
EXHIBIT A 
R. PAUL VAN DAM - 3312 
Attorney General 
STEPHEN J. SORENSON - 3049 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Defendants 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 538-1016 
,5 District 
JAN 1 1 1390 
£31 <<KCou-jrY v) 
D-;:;i J iy ^ " ' - r i 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD D. MADSEN and NANCY 
MADSEN, his wife, BOYD A. 
SWENSEN and BEATRICE SWEN-
SEN, his wife, BLAINE 
ANDERSON and SHEREE 
ANDERSON, his wife, HOPE A . 
HILTON, CYNTHIA HILTON, 
RALPH M. HILTON, GENE 
HELLAND and the MIDDLE EAST 
FOUNDATION, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
MIRVIN D. BORTHICK, W. SMOOT 
BRIMHALL, and JOHN DOES I to 
V, being former Commission-
ers of the Utah Department 
of Financial Institutions, 
Defendants. 
ORDER DENTING PLAINTIFFS' 
MOTIONS FOR CLASS CERTIFICA-
TION AND GRANTING MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF DEFEN-
DANT W. SMOOT BRIMHALL 
Civil No. C-83-5404 
Judge Pat B. Brian 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification and Second 
Motion for Class Certification, and the Motion for Summary Judg-
ment of Defendant W. Smoot Brimhall, came on for hearing before 
the Court in the above-captioned action on Tuesday, November 14, 
1989, at 1:30 p.m. Plaintiffs were represented by their counsel, 
Robert J. DeBry of Robert J. DeBry and Associates, and Defendants 
were represented by their counsel, Stephen J. Sorenson, Assistant 
Attorney General. The Court had previously reviewed the memoranda 
and exhibits on file pertaining to these motions, and heard 
extensive argument from counsel at the hearing. The Court also 
granted leave for counsel to submit further supplemental memoran-
da on the motions, has received such memoranda from each counsel/ 
and has reviewed them carefully* The Court thus being well ad-
vised in the premises, 
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Plain-
tiffs' Motion for Class Certification and Second Motion for Class 
Certification are hereby denied. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the 
Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendant W. Smoot Brimhall is 
hereby granted, and this action dismissed with prejudice as to 
Defendant Brimhall. 
DATED this JI day of / • / SZ'f /S tZ^r 
BY THE COURT: 
.#8?-
HONORABLE PAT B. BREM*—^ 
District Judge 
R. PAUL VAN DAM - 3312 
Attorney General 
JOHN P. SOLTIS - 3040 
REED M. STRINGHAM - 4679 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Defendants 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 538-1016 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD D. MADSEN and NANCY j 
MADSEN, his wife, BOYD A. 
SWENSEN and BEATRICE l 
SWENSEN, his wife, BLAINE 
ANDERSON and SHEREE i 
ANDERSON, his wife, HOPE A. 
HILTON, CYNTHIA HILTON, j 
RALPH M. HILTON, GENE 
HELLAND and the MIDDLE EAST i 
FOUNDATION, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MIRVIN D. BORTHICK, W. SMOOT 
BRIMHALL, and JOHN DOES I to I 
V, being former 
Commissioners of the Utah i 
Department of Financial 
Institutions, i 
Defendants. i 
t ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE 
I PLEADINGS 
! Civil No. C-83-5404 
Judge Pat B. Brian 
Defendant Mirvin D. Borthick's motion for judgment on 
the pleadings came before the Court on April 6, 1990. Plaintiffs 
were represented by Gordon K. Jensen, Esq. and Edward T. Wells, 
Esq., and defendant was represented by John P. Soltis and Reed M. 
Stringham III, Assistant Attornevs Genpr^l. 
'" '• . - t ' r ' ••« 
MAY 7 1990 
£vm&&o 
The Court having reviewed the pleadings, motion and 
memoranda on file, and having heard argument on the motion, now 
makes and enters the following order: 
1. Defendant Mirvin D. Borthick, in the discharge of 
his statutory duties and responsibilities as the former 
Commissioner of the Utah Department of Financial Institutions, 
owed no duty of care to plaintiffs individually on which a cause 
of action for gross negligence can be based. 
2. The plaintiffs allege that defendant Mirvin D. 
Borthick was grossly negligent in the manner in which he 
discharged his statutory duties and responsibilities as former 
Commissioner of the Utah Department of Financial Institutions. 
As a matter of law, the interpretation of the statutes that 
describe his duties and responsibilities is a discretionary act 
and is protected in this action by the doctrine of good faith 
immunity. 
3. Plaintiffs' complaint fails to state a cause of 
action against defendant in his individual capacity as a matter 
of law. 
4. The motion for judgment on the pleadings is 
granted. 
DATED this 7 day of //? / d Of , 1990, 
BY THE COURT: 
PAT B. BRIAN 
District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
This is to certify that I mailed and sent by telefax 
(262-8995), a copy of the foregoing Order Granting Defendant's 
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, to the following this 
Jf ** day of rlf*,/ , 1990: 
Gordon K. Jensen, Esq. 
Edward T. Wells, Esq. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
4252 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
.*J>tty ^U^/& 
EXHIBIT B 
R. PAUL VAN DAM -
Attorney General 
STEPHEN J. SORENSON - 3049 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 538-1016 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD D. MADSEN and NANCY i 
MADSEN, BOYD A. SWENSEN and 
BEATRICE SWENSEN, BLAINE « 
ANDERSON and SHERREE 
ANDERSON, HOPE A. HILTON, l 
CYNTHIA HILTON, RALPH M. 
HILTON, GENE HELLAND and THE i 
MIDDLE EAST FOUNDATION, 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, 
vs. 
MIRVIN D. BORTHICK, W. SMOOT 
BRIMHALL, and John Does I i 
to V, being former Commis-
sioners of the Utah Depart- i 
ment of Financial Institu-
tions ,, i 
Defendants/Respondents. i 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
I Case No. 19704 
Defendant and Appellee W. Smoot Brimhall, by and 
through his counsel of record, pursuant to Rule 35 of the Rules 
of the Utah Supreme Court, petitions the Court for rehearing in 
the above-captioned matter on the limited question of the appli-
cation of Utah Code Ann. S 78-12-40 to this Appellee, in light of 
the fact that he was not named a party defendant in the predeces-
sor action to this. 
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
This action arises out of the failure of Pleasant Grove 
Finance Company, which occurred on or about July 18, 1980 (R. 5) 
Plaintiffs in this action, investors in Grove Finance, filed an 
action in March of 1981 against Mirvin Borthick, former Commis-
sioner of Financial Institutions, and against the State of Utah 
(R. 35). That action was dismissed by the District Court for 
failure to file a notice of claim, and the dismissal was affirmed 
by this Court in Madsen v. Borthick, 658 P.2d 627 (Utah 1983) 
[hereinafter "Madsen I"]. Former Commissioner W. Smoot Brimhall 
was not named a party in that action (see, e.g., caption of 
Madsen I, 658: P^Lat 627)^. 
Orwuly 20,(19834<R. 2), the investors filed their 
Complaint in this action, deleting the State as a defendant, 
adding Commissioner Brimhall (Commissioners Borthick's immediate 
predecessor), and changing allegations of "negligence" to "gross 
Footnote 8 of this Court's opinion in this case, 97 
Utah Adv. Rep. at 19, states that the parties have conceded and 
the Court assumes for purposes of the appeal "that the cause of 
action arose on June 18, 1980, the date of Grove Finance's clo-
sure by the State." The same statement is made at 97 Utah Adv. 
Rep. at 18. Appellee believes that the correct date was July 18, 
1980, since this is the date alleged in the Plaintiffs' Complaint 
(R. 5) and relied upon by the parties in proceedings below (e.g., 
R. 47-8, 71). 
negligence," but otherwise attempting to set forth the same 
cause of action as that in Madsen I. The District Court granted 
the State's motion for summary judgment on grounds of res judica-
ta , failure to file a notice of claim under the Governmental 
Immunity Act, and application of the three possible statutes of 
limitation (R. 89-90). This Court reversed in Madsen v. Borthick, 
97 Utah Adv. Rep. 13 (1988) (wMadsen II"). 
BASIS FOR STATUTE OF LIMITATION RULING IN MADSEN II 
Appellees had argued in the District Court that the 
present action was barred by one of three possible statutes of 
limitation (R. 4 7-49) , and that the statutes were not tolled by 
Commissioner Brimhall was served with summons on July 
21, 1983 (R. 9). 
3
 Utah Code Ann. S 78-12-26(4) provides: 
Within three years: 
• • • 
[A]n action for a liability created by 
the statutes of this state, other than for a 
penalty or forfeiture under the laws of this 
state, except where in special cases a dif-
ferent limitation is prescribed by the stat-
utes of this state. 
Utah Code Ann. S 78-12-28(1) provides: 
Within two years, an action: 
[A]gainst a marshall, sheriff, consta-
ble, or other officer upon a liability in-
curred by the doing of an act in his official 
capacity, and by virtue of his office, or by 
the omission of an official duty.... 
Utah Code Ann. S 78-12-29(2) provides: 
•3-
4 
Utah Code Ann. S 78-12-40 since, due to the failure to file a 
notice a claim, the action was not -commenced within due time" 
(R. 77), This Court rejected that argument in Madsen II, reason-
ing that an action is commenced "by the filing of a complaint or 
the service of a summons, not by the filing of a notice of 
claim," 97 Utah Adv. Rep. at 18, and that "if dismissal of a 
first action is appealed, section 78-12-40's extension of time 
for filing a second action runs from the date of the dismissal's 
affirmance." Id. 
In so ruling, however, the Court overlooked the fact 
that Commissioner Brimhall was never named in Madsen I, and 
therefore no action was commenced against him in due time to be 
subject to the saving provision of S 78-12-40. In the District 
3 3 
Cont. Cont. Within one year: 
• • • 
An action upon a statute for a penalty 
or forfeiture where the action is given to an 
individual... 
4 
That section provides: 
If any action is commenced within due 
time and a judgment thereon for the plaintiff 
is reversed, or if the plaintiff fails in 
such action or upon a cause of action other 
wise than upon the merits, and the time 
limited either by law or contract for com-
mencing the same shall have expired, the 
plaintiff, or if he dies and the cause of 
action survives, his representatives, may 
commence a new action within one year after 
the reversal or failure. 
-4-
Court, the Plaintiffs candidly conceded as follows: 
Plaintiffs filed the complaint with the 
court in the instant action on July 20, 1983. 
The cause of action arose when Grove Finance 
was forced to close its doors on July 18, 
1983. Under normal circumstances, the action 
would have been barred by the statute of 
limitations which at most ran for three years 
and thus, possibly expired on July 18, 1983. 
However, Section 78-12-40, Utah Code Ann., 
applies in this matter... 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judg-
ment, R. 71 (emphasis added). Plaintiffs made no argument, in the 
District Court or this Court, that any statute of limitation 
other than one of the three cited by the Commissioners should 
apply> and conceded that the filing of the action was more than 
three years beyond the date on which it arose. Section 78-12-40 
cannot reasonably be construed as applying to Commissioner Brim-
hall, since no action, timely or otherwise, was commenced against 
Appellees submit that this action is clearly based upon a 
liability incurred by a public officer "by the omission of an 
official duty," i.e., as the plaintiffs allege, the Commission-
ers' failure adequately to supervise Grove Finance, and that the 
two-year statute in Utah Code Ann. S 78-12-28(1) would seem most 
squarely on point. On the other hand, this Court noted in Madsen 
JI that enactment in 1978 of S 63-30-4 of the Governmental Immuni-
ty Act established a new statutory standard for official immuni-
ty, and precluded "all statutory or commonlaw causes of action 
against an employee in his or her personal capacity for acts or 
omissions which occur during the performance of the employee's 
duties, except as authorized in the Governmental Immunity Act." 
658 P.2d at 633. Thus, any action brought against an official in 
his personal capacity for omissions occurring during the perfor-
mance of his duties is brought under provisions of the Immunity 
Act, and the three-year statute regarding "liability created by 
the statutes of this state" may also apply. 
•5-
him until more than three years after the doors of Grove Finance 
closed. 
Commissioner Brimhall pointed out to the District Court 
(R. 35-6, 38-9) and to ^ his/Court (Brief of ^spnn^ntgj pp._?j 
19) that he was not n^med as a defendant in the earlier action. 
Although argument of the statute-of-limitation issue centered on 
the application of S 78-12-40 generally, Commissioner Brimhall 
submits that the Court should reconsider its application as to 
him, so as to avoid permitting a suit which even the plaintiffs 
concede, absent any involvement by him in the earlier suit, was 
untimely filed. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellee W. Smoot Brimhall prays the Court to reconsid-
er its decision on the narrow issue of application of Utah Code 
Ann. S 78-12-40 to him, in light of the fact that he was not a 
named defendant in Madsen I. 
DATED t h i s ~rf/ day of JX/sMt^ 1989 . 
/ 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
A t t o r n e y General 
<? 
'>C y 
STEPHEN JV^SORENSON 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Defendant and 
Appellee W. Smoot Brimhall 
-6-
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
Thi8 U to ce«i^ *** I -U-. « » « * " ^ " ^ 
. „. . Z^6 day of ' / — ^ - / - ' 1989' 
following this . 7 ^  ,- aa* 
Daniel F. Bertch 
Robert J. DeBry
 s c c n r T A T E S^ 
ROBERT J. DeBRY & ASSOCIATES 
4001 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
EXHIBIT C 
SUPREME COURT ^OETIUTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
March 16, 1989 
OFFICE OF THE CLERK 
Daniel F. Bertch 
Robert J. Debry, Esq. 
Phillip B. Shell, Esq, 
Robert J. Debry St Associates 
4001 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
RESENT 
Richard D. Madsen and Nancy Madsen, 
his wife, Boyd A. Swensen and Beatrice 
Swensen, his wife, Blaine Anderson and 
Sheree Anderson, his wife, Hope A. Hilton, 
Cynthia Hilton, Ralph M. Hilton, Gene 
Helland and the Middle East Foundation, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. No. 19704 
Mirvin D. Borthick, W. Smoot Brimhall, 
and John Does I to V, being former 
Commissioners of the Utah Department 
of Financial Institutions, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
THIS DAY, Petition for Rehearing having been heretofore 
considered, and the Court being sufficiently advised in the 
premises, it is ordered that a rehearing be, and the same is, 
denied. 
Geoffrey J. Butlep, Clerk 
EXHIBIT D 
FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE 
Salt Lake County, Utah 
APR 20 1934 
H. Di*on Kinney. C t^rV 3rd D**t. Court 
By Deputy Cleft. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MATHEW FENN HILTON, et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs 
MIRVIN D. BORTHICK, et al.. 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CIVIL NOS. C-82-5165 
C-82-5872 
C-82-3798 
(Consolidated) 
The Motions of the plaintiffs for Summary Judgment, and the 
reciprocal Motions for Summary Judgment of the defendants all 
came on regularly for hearing on November 3, 1983. Argument 
was had on that date, and the hearing was continued to November 8, 
1983 for further argument. The matters before the Court in the 
above-referenced civil numbers have all been consolidated 
into one action. All interested parties were present or 
represented by counsel at the hearings above-referenced. Counsel 
argued their respective positions, and the Cdurt granted 
defendants1 Motion to open and publish Depositions of Howard 
Sherwood and Mirvin Borthick. The Court took the matter under 
advisement to further review the extensive Memoranda filed by 
the parties, and to review the case law cited by counsel. The 
Court has now carefully considered the arguments advanced by 
HILTON, ET AL VS. 
BORTHICK, ET Ah PAGE TWO MEMORANDUM DECISION 
the respective parties, and the case law authority cited by 
all counsel to the controversy, and otherwise being fully 
advised, enters the following Memorandum Decision. 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Based upon the Court's review of this matter, including 
the Affidavits, Depositions and matters in the file and the legal 
authorities cited, the Court concludes that, the plaintiffs' Motion 
for Summary Judgment must be denied in that there are existing 
significant and material issues of fact to be determined by the 
trier of fact. The material issues of fact prohibit this Court from 
passing on the questions presented as a matter of law on a 
motion for summary judgment. Likewise, plaintiffs1 more limited 
request, presented orallv at the time of the argument in this 
matter, that this Court determine at this stage of the proceedings 
what statutory duties, if any there be, apply to the facts of 
this case, must also be denied. This Court should not, under 
the disputed facts of this case, determine what statutory 
standards may apply to the defendants at this stage of the 
proceedings. Such a decision should be made when the evidence 
is in, or sufficient evidence is presented to allow this Court 
to reach some determinations on the respective theories of 
liability, and make appropriate decisions based upon the evidence 
then presented as to what statutory duties or other duties 
that may run from the defendants to the plaintiffs may be. 
HILTON, ET AL VS. 
BORTHICK, ET AL PAGE THREE MEMORANDUM DECISION 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
As to the defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, and 
that portion thereof which seeks a ruling of this Court that 
all obligations toward the plaintiffs were adhered to as a 
matter of law by the defendants, this Court must similarly deny 
such a request as was done in the plaintiffs' Motion for Summary 
Judgment, there being substantial and material questions of fact 
remaining for determination. 
Dealing with that portion of the defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment asserting the defense of governmental immunity, 
the Court is compelled to reach a substantially different result. 
Based upon the case authority cited by the defendants, including 
the Utah Supreme Court language in Madsen vs. Borthick, 
656 P.2d 627 (Utah 1983), supervision of a financial institution, 
as was the situation here, constitutes a governmental activity. 
Accordingly, unless the governmental immunity statute waives 
governmental immunity, the action must be dismissed. Under the 
laws of this state, governmental immunity has been waived for 
negligent acts and/or omissions of state employees, unless 
the conduct falls into those specific exceptions listed in 
Section 63-30-10 of the Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended. 
Addressing the question as to whether or not the alleged conduct 
of the defendants falls into the exceptions where governmental 
immunity is not waived under the subparts of Section 63-30-10, 
HILTON, £T AL VS. 
BORTHICK, E^T AL PAGE FOUR MEMORANDUM DECISION 
this Court finds that the defendants' arguments are persuasive. 
The claims asserted against the defendants arise out of acts or 
omissions that fall into the exceptions listed in Section 63-30-10. 
The nature of defendant Borthick's actions or claimed failure 
to act, even if such were proven, are discretionary, and 
do not fall into a class of activities where governmental 
immunity has been waived. The alleged misrepresentations of the 
defendants are not waived under Section 63-30-10. The alleged 
errors of the defendants in issuing or revoking licenses 
are also not waived under Section 63-30-10. The foregoing, 
coupled with the policy reasons enumerated by the Supreme Court 
for not imposing liability on public officials who perform 
discretionary functions in good faith, leads this Court to the 
conclusion that that portion of the defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment asserting the defense of governmental immunity 
is well taken and should be the finding of this Court in this 
case. It follows that as no claim against the state can be 
maintained, there therefore c.an be no claim against Commissioner 
Borthick. Plaintiffs1 claims against the defendants are 
therefore dismissed on the basis of governmental immunity. 
Counsel for the defendants is to prepare an appropriate 
Order in conformance with this Memorandum Decision, and submit 
HILTON, ET AL VS. 
BORTHICK, ET AL PAGE FIVE MEMORANDUM DECISION 
the same to the Court for review and signature pursuant to 
Rule 2.9 of the Rules of Practice for the District and Circuit 
Courts of the State of Utah. 
Dated this ^Mt? day of April, 1984. 
\5\ 
TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
EXHIBIT E 
KESLER & Rl^2* 
Attorneys . Plaintiff and the Class 
2000 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 355-9333 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MATTHEW FENI1 HILTON, et al., : 
plaintiffs, : ORDER 
v. : Civil No. C82-3798 
: C82-5165 
MIRVIN D. BORTHICK, et al., : (Consolidated) 
Defendants. : 
On September 13, 1982, this Court filed its order 
determining that this action shall be maintained as a class 
action under Rule 23, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, by the 
plaintiff Matthew Fenn Hilton for himself and as the 
representative party for the class which was defined in that 
order. The plaintiff having prepared a notice of class 
certification, the form and content of which have been 
stipulated to by counsel for all parties. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. The above-entitled action shall be maintained as 
a class action under Rule 23(b)(3), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
2. The class shall consist of all individuals who 
had deposited money or purchased debentures in Grove Finance 
Company on July 18, 1980, excepting those whose rights have 
been previously judicially determined. 
3. The form of notice attached hereto is the best 
members the class consisting of a. individuals who had 
deposited money or purchased debentures in Grove Finance 
Company on July 18, 1980, except those whose rights have 
previously been judicially determined as defined in the order 
determining that this class shall be maintained as a class 
action and modified by this order. It is in compliance with 
Rule 23(c)(2), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
4. On or before the day of November, 1982, 
the notice shall be sent by the plaintiffs to each member of 
the class by first class mail. If any class member, as define 
in the order determining that this action shall be maintained 
t 
as a class action, is a party of record to this litigation, 
service of this notice shall be made on counsel of record for 
such class member. 
5. The plaintiff on or before the day of 
November, 1982 shall file with the clerk of the court a 
certificate of service setting forth the names and addresses o: 
all members of the class to whom the notice was sent. 
6. The plaintiffs on or before the day of 
December, 1982 shall file with the clerk of the court and make 
available to defendants any request for exclusion from members 
of the class received in response to said notice. 
DATED this day of October, 1982. 
BY THE COURT: 
M, 
Phi/lip R. Fishier, 
District Court Judge 
EXHIBIT F 
restitutions—Appointment, term, qualifications, salary, oath and bond.— 
1) There shall be a state department of financial institutions which 
hall have charge of the execution of the laws of this state relating to 
ianks and other financial institutions subject to this title and relating to 
he business conducted by each. 
(2) The chief officer of the state department of financial institutions 
hall be the commissioner of financial institutions who shall be appointed 
>y the governor by and with the consent of the senate. He shall hold 
>ffiee for the term of four years and until his successor is appointed and 
lualified, but he shall be subject to removal at the pleasure of the governor. 
(3) The commissioner of financial institutions shall be a resident of 
his state and a citizen of the United States and shall have had sufficient 
ixperience in banking in an executive or administrative capacity or as 
in employee of a state or federal bank supervisory agency to demonstrate 
lis qualifications and fitness to perform the duties of his office. 
(4) The salary of the commissioner of financial institutions shall be 
ixed by the governor in accordance with standards adopted by the depart-
nent of finance, and in addition thereto he may be allowed actual travel-
ng expenses necessarily incurred in attending to official business. He shall 
qualify by taking the constitutional oath of office and by giving to the state 
i bond in such amount and in such form as shall be prescribed by the de-
Dartment of finance, conditioned for the faithful performance of his duties, 
rhe premiums on such bond shall be paid by the state. 
7-1-3. Biennial reports by commissioner.—The bank commissioner shall 
make on or before the 1st day of October, biennially, a report to the gov-
ernor, containing a copy of the last report furnished by each institution 
under the supervision of the banking department and any other proceed-
ings had or done by the department showing generally the condition of 
tuny itemized upon proper vouchers and certified by the bank commissioner 
to the board of examiners to be audited and allowed as other claims 
against the state. 
7-1-7. Institutions under banking department.—All banks, ail loan ana 
trust corporations, all building and loan associations, all industrial loan 
companies, all credit unions, all small loan businesses required to obtain 
a license under any provision of law, and all bank service corporations 
shall be under the supervision of the banking department, and shall be 
subject to examination by the bank commissioner and the examiners. 
7-1-8. Visitation and examination.—The bank commissioner, or an 
caminer, shall visit and examine every bank, savings bank, every loan 
ad trust corporation, every building and loan association, every industrial 
•an company, every small loan business, and every co-operative bank, at 
ast once in each year. At every such examination careful inquiry shall 
2 made as to the condition and resources of the institution examined, 
ie mode of conducting and managing its affairs, the official actions of 
s directors and officers, the investment and disposition of its funds, the 
jcurity afforded to members, if any, and to those by whom its engage-
Lents are held, whether or not it is violating any of the provisions of law 
.x.n.x^ s
 w wiyviawn* or 10 tne Dusmess ot tne institution examined 
hether or not it is complying with its articles of incorporation and 
flaws, and as to such other matters as the 
7-1-13. Removal of incompetent bank officers and employees.—If the 
bank commissioner finds that any officer or employee of any institution 
under the supervision of the banking department is dishonest, reckless or 
incompetent, or fails to perform any duty of his office, he shall notify the 
board of directors of such institution in writing of his objections to such 
officer or employee, and said board shall within twenty days after receipt 
of such notification meet and consider such objections, first giving notice 
to the bank commissioner of the time and place of meeting. If the board 
finds the objections well-founded, such officer or employee shall be im-
mediately removed. 
7-1-14. Directors to examine affairs of institution.—The bank commis-
sioner may at any time, and at least once a year shall, require the board 
of directors of every institution under the supervision of the banking 
department to examine or cause to be examined fully the books, papers 
and affairs of the institution of which they are directors, and particularly 
the loans, discounts and overdrafts thereof, with a special purpose of 
ascertaining the value and security thereof and of the collateral security, if 
any, given in connection therewith, and to inquire into such other matters 
as the bank commissioner or bank examiner may require, and to cause a 
report thereof to be placed on file with the records of such institution, 
which report shall be subject to examination by the bank commissioner or 
examiner. 
7-1-17. Reports — Number per year — Publication — Fees.—The bank 
commissioner shall each year make not less than four calls for report of 
condition upon each bank and trust company under the supervision of 
the banking department. Such report shall be made according to the form 
prescribed by the bank commissioner, and shall be verified by the oath or 
affirmation of the president or cashier and attested by at least three 
directors. A copy thereof duly certified by the bank commissioner shall 
De published by the institution making the same in some newspaper hav-
ing general circulation in the county where the institution is situated, 
and proof of such publication shall be filed in the office of the bank 
commissioner within thirty days from the time of the receipt by the 
institution of the copy certified by the bank commissioner. The fee for 
filing and certifying each such report shall be $5. 
7-1-18. Calls for special reports.—The bank commissioner shall have 
power to call for special reports from any institution under the super-
vision of the banking department whenever in his judgment the same 
may be necessary. 
7-1-26. Articles of incorporation—Approval DJ pans, wmmnsumcx— 
Procedure on application—Judicial review of act, decision or ruling of com-
missioner—Revocation for failure to activate business—Resale of charter, 
license or permit prohibited.—(1) The bank commissioner shall have dis-
cretionary power in the approval of articles of incorporation of institu-
tions subject to the supervision of the banking department and applications 
for licenses to transact in this state any business subject to such supervision, 
and may refuse to grant his approval when the plan of operation does not 
comply with the laws of this state governing such institution or business, 
or with accepted and prevailing practices, or when the incorporators or 
organizers or any of them shall not be of such character, responsibility and 
general fitness as to warrant the belief that the business will be honestly 
conducted in accordance with law and for the best interests of the members, 
customers and depositors of the institution, or when the location or field of 
operation of the proposed business shall be in such close proximity to an 
established business subject to this title that such established business 
might be unreasonably interfered with and the support of the new business 
would be such as to make improbable its success, or when other good and 
sufficient reasons exist for such refusal. 
(2) An application for approval of articles of incorporation of a bank, 
loan and trust company or industrial loan corporation shall be set forth 
in such form and contain such information as the bank commissioner may 
reasonably require. Upon receipt of an application and not less than thirty 
days before acting on an application, the bank commissioner shall give 
notice thereof by publication in three successive issues in a newspaper of 
general circulation in the county in which the principal place of business 
is to be established. Any interested person may file a written protest to the 
granting of such application stating the grounds therefor. The bank com-
missioner may, at his discretion, hold a public hearing on any application 
whether or not a protest is filed. Any application not acted upon within 
six months from the date of filing shall be deemed denied, and the bank 
commissioner shall thereupon issue a written decision denying the appli-
cation. 
(3) The decision of the bank commissioner granting or denying an 
application shall be in writing and state the reasons therefor. A copy of 
the decision shall be mailed by the bank commissioner to the applicant and 
all protestants. The bank commissioner may impose such reasonable con-
ditions on the granting of an application as he deems necessary for the 
public welfare and to carry out the purposes of this act. 
(4) Any applicant for an approval of articles of incorporation, a permit 
to establish a branch, or a license to transact any business subject to the 
supervision of the banking department or any protestant to such applica-
tion, feeling aggrieved by the act, decision or ruling of the bank com-
missioner with respect thereto, shall be entitled to judicial review thereof 
by filing, within thirty days after the decision or ruling of the bank com-
missioner is issued, any applicable form of action (including actions for 
declaratory judgment or writs of prohibitory or mandatory injunction), 
in the district court of the district in which the office of the bank com-
missioner is located. The reviewing court shall have power to hold un-
lawful and set aside any act, decision or ruling of the bank commissioner 
found to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not 
in accordance with law. 
(5) Any approval by the bank commissioner of articles of incor-
poration, a license to conduct business or an application to establish a 
branch shall be deemed revoked unless the business so authorized is open 
and operating within one year of the date of such approval, except that 
the bank commissioner, on written application made before the expiration 
of such period and for good cause shown, may extend the date for activa-
tion for additional periods not to exceed six months each. 
(6) It shall be unlawful to obtain, for the purpose of resale, a charter, 
license or permit to operate any bank or other financial institution under the 
supervision of the banking department. The charter, license or permit may 
be deemed revoked and the bank commissioner may take possession of the 
business and property of any bank of other financial institution under his 
supervision as provided in chapter 2 of this title, if, within a period of five 
years after the approval of the articles of incorporation or the granting 
»f a license or permit to do business by the bank commissioner, the assets 
>r the license to do business or more than 49 per cent of the authorized 
apital stock of such bank or other financial institution is sold or exchanged, 
>r if, within such period, such bank or other financial institution merges or 
onsolidates with another bank or other financial institution, unless the 
>ank or other financial institution involved shall establish upon written 
ipplication to the bank commissioner and by the clear preponderance of 
he evidence, that its charter, license or permit was not obtained for the 
rarpose of resale or that such sale, exchange, merger or consolidation is 
lecessary to protect depositors or prevent failure. 
7-*-*ii. tuiugit wuipuiauons—commissioner may revoKe certificate.— 
h^e bank commissioner may for cause at any time revoke the certificate 
if approval and authorization of any foreign corporation authorized to 
ransact any business in this state and subject to the supervision of the 
tanking department. 
islature finds that it is in the public interest to strengthen the regulation, 
supervision, and examination of persons, firms, corporations, associations, 
and other business entities furnishing financial services to the people of 
this state or owning and controlling those businesses. The legislature fur-
ther finds that there have been substantial changes in the structure of the 
financial services industry and the nature and characteristics of the insti-
tutions and other business entities furnishing those services. Accordingly, 
it is the purpose of this act to expand and strengthen the duties, powers, 
and responsibilities of the state department of financial institutions and 
to place under its jurisdiction all classes of institutions and other busi-
nesses engaged in furnishing financial services to the people of this state 
or owning and controlling those businesses. The legislature further finds 
that there has been a trend toward the expansion of the powers and func-
tions of federally chartered or insured financial institutions to the competi-
tive disadvantage of institutions chartered under the laws of this state. 
Accordingly, it is the further purpose of this act to grant powers, privi-
leges, and immunities to state chartered institutions at least equal to those 
possessed by federally chartered or insured institutions of the same class 
furnishing financial services to the people of this state in order to nromote 
competitive equality in the financial services industry in this state and to 
protect the interests of shareholders, members, depositor^Tald other ait 
tomers of state chartered institutions. | 
The legislature further finds that the commissioner of financial institu 
tions under section 5 of chapter 4, Laws of Utah 1980, Ls r^mmendfd 
in order to protect the depositors, customers, and sha eholde^fdepost 
X t f hT^ng ** Principal place of busi"*s to this I S 
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the state department of financial institutions be empowered to reflate rte 
estebhshment m this state of offices of foreign depository S t i o n s t 
defined in that legislation and to restrict and regulate Se acquTsition tf 
ft^ftET** °f " T 8 ! ? 1 7 i n 8 t i t U t i 0 n S d0 in* business^X stete It is the further purpose of this act to implement the findings and recom-
mendations of the commissioner in this report 
It is the intent of the legislature that the provisions of this act be inter-
preted and implemented to promote those purposes. 
7-1 -501. Powers and duties of commissioner as to financial institu-
tions — Rules and regulations to be promulgated. In. addition to the 
powers, duties, and responsibilities specified elsewhere in this title, the 
commissioner shall have all the functions, powers, duties, and 
responsiblities with respect to institutions, persons, or businesses subject 
to the jurisdiction of the department contained in article 3. 
The commissioner shall adopt and issue rules and regulations which 
shall be consistent with the purposes and provisions of this title, and may 
revise, amend, or repeal the same: 
(1) To govern the administration and operation of the department of 
financial institutions; 
(2) To supervise the conduct, operation, or management of depository 
institutions subject to the jurisdiction of the department and the examina-
tion, statements, and reports thereof; 
(3) To authorize state chartered depository institutions to engage in 
any activity, or to grant to those institutions additional rights, powers, 
privileges, benefits, or immunities, which they could engage in or which 
they would possess were they chartered under the laws of the United 
States. In granting this authority the commissioner shall consider the fol-
lowing: 
(a) The need for competitive equality between state chartered and fed-
erally chartered institutions; 
(b) The adverse effect on shareholders, members, depositors, and other 
customers of state chartered financial institutions if equal protection of 
those institutions with federally chartered institutions of the same class 
is not promptly available; 
(c) Whether the circumstances are such that awaiting action by the leg-
islature would unduly prejudice state chartered institutions, their share-
holders, members, depositors, and other customers or adversely affect the 
public interest 
(4) To safeguard the interest of shareholders, members, depositors, and 
other customers of institutions and other persons subject to the jurisdic-
tion of the department; 
(5) To establish the criteria to be applied in granting applications for 
approval of new institutions, branches, relocation, merger, and consolida-
tions, and changes in the control of institutions subject to the jurisdiction 
of the department The criteria shall be consistent with the provisions of 
this title and shall require as minimum for approval of any such applica-
tion: 
(a) Except as provided in chapter 9 with respect to credit unions, a 
showing that no properly managed and soundly operated existing institu-
vu/ A suuwiug tuat uuc msutuuuii mvoivea wiii DC saieiy ana sounaiy 
operated after approval and implementation of the matters covered in the 
application or the order of the commissioner, and 
(c) A showing that the public interest will be promoted by the approval 
of the application. 
The criteria established under subsection (5) shall not be applied so as 
to make it more difficult for a state chartered institution to obtain 
approval of any such application than for a federally chartered institution 
in the same class to obtain approval from the appropriate federal regula-
tory agency or administrator. 
(6) To protect the privacy of the records of any institution subject to 
the jurisdiction of the department pertaining to a particular depositor or 
other customer of the institution. Rules and regulations promulgated under 
this paragraph shall be consistent with federal laws and regulations appli-
cable to the institution. Any institution required to produce records pursu-
ant to a subpoena or other order of a court of competent jurisdiction shall 
be reimbursed for the cost of retrieval and reproduction of the records by 
the person seeking their production; 
(7) To classify all records kept by institutions subject to the jurisdic-
tion of the department and to prescribe the period for which records of 
each class shall be retained. Regulations promulgated under this para-
graph for any class of financial institution shall be consistent with federal 
laws and regulations applicable to that same class of financial institutions 
and shall take into consideration: 
(a) Actions at law and administrative proceedings in which the produc-
tion of the records might be necessary or desirable; 
(b) State and federal statutes of limitations applicable to the action oi 
proceedings; 
(c) The availability, from other sources, of information contained in 
these records; and 
(d) Such other matters as the commissioner may consider pertinent in 
formulating regulations which require institutions to retain their records 
for as short a period as commensurate with the interest of customers, 
members, depositors, and shareholders of the institutions and of the people 
of this state in having the records available. 
Regulations promulgated under this subsection (7) shall provide that any 
institution may dispose of any record which has been retained for the 
period prescribed by the commissioner for retention of records of its class 
and shall thereafter be under no duty to produce those records in any 
action or Droceedincr and shall incur no Habilitv to anv nerann bv reafton 
may cause any and all records at any time in its custody to be reproduced 
by the micro-photographic or other equivalent process. Any such reproduc-
tion shall have the same force and effect as the original and shall be 
admissible into evidence as if it were the original 
(8) To establish reasonable classes of depository and other financial 
institutions including, in any event, separate classes for savings and loan 
associations and related institutions, banks and related institutions, credit 
unions, and thrift institutions, and to establish the following for each class 
in a manner consistent with the purposes and provisions of this title: 
(a) Eligible classes or types of investments for the deposits and other 
funds of those institutions; 
(b) Minimum standards for the capital and surplus required to engage 
in the businesses conducted by each class or to establish a branch or addi-
tional office of an institution of each class. Within each class minimum 
standards shall be uniform. The minimum standards shall be in amount-
sufficient to protect depositors and other customers of the institutions, tak-
ing into consideration any reserve requirements applicable to each class 
of financial institutions; 
(c) Eligible assets for the computation of capital and surplus and regu-
lations prescribing or authorizing the use of subordinated notes or deben-
tures and determining the extent to which they may be used for the 
purpose of determining capital or when they are to be regarded as debt 
for any purpose under this title; 
(d) Uniform reserve requirements for institutions within each class. 
These reserve requirements shall be uniform for all classes of institutions 
with respect to transaction accounts; 
(e) limitations on borrowings by each class of institution in relation 
to the adequacy of its capital accounts, the character and condition of its 
assets and its deposits and other liabilities; 
(f) Limitations on the amount and nature of loans to any person or 
related persons in relation to the capital and surplus. 
Except with respect to reserve requirements on transaction accounts as 
provided in subsection (8) (d), no restrictions or requirements imposed 
under this subsection (8) shall be more stringent than those required under 
federal laws or regulations for federally chartered institutions of the same 
type or class. 
(9) To authorize financial institutions engaged in making loans secured 
by an interest in real estate to use such forms of trust deeds, mortgages, 
or other instruments creating a security interest in real estate as are 
approved or authorized by the comptroller of the currency, the board oi 
crovernors of the federal reserve system, the federal deposit insurance cor-
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tion, the federal home loan mortgage corporation, the veterans administra-
tion, the department of housing and urban development, or any other 
federal agency or instrumentality supervising or insuring depository insti-
tutions or providing a secondary market for loans secured by an interest 
in real estate; 
(10) To define unfair trade practices of persons subject to the jurisdic-
tion of the department and prohibiting or restricting such practices; 
(11) To establish reasonable standards to ensure the fair and truthful 
advertising of (a) services offered by a financial institution, (b) the charges 
for such services, (c) the interest or other compensation to be paid on 
deposits or any debt instrument offered for sale by the institution, and (d) 
the nature and extent of any insurance on deposits, savings, or share 
accounts, thrift certificates of deposit, thrift savings accounts, NOW 
accounts, share draft accounts, transaction accounts, or any evidence of 
indebtedness issued, offered for sale, offered to sell or sold by any person 
subject to the jurisdiction of the department; 
(12) To define what shall constitute an impairment of capital for each 
class of financial institutions under his jurisdiction; 
(13) To designate holidays as defined in section 63-13-2 on which deposi-
tory institutions shall be closed for the payment of checks, drafts, orders, 
or other instruments drawn on transaction accounts; 
(14) To regulate the issuance, offer to sell, offer for sale or sale of a 
security or the advertising thereof to the extent authorized by section 
7-1-503; 
(15) To require the officers of any institution or other person subject 
to his jurisdiction to open and keep a standard set of books or computer 
records or both, for the purpose of keeping accurate and convenient records 
sf the transactions and accounts of the institution in such a manner as 
bo enable the commissioner, supervisors, and department examiners to 
readily ascertain its true condition. These requirements shall be in keeping 
pith generally accepted accounting procedures for financial institutions. 
7-2-1. When commissioner may take possession.—The bank commission-
er may forthwith take possession of the business and property of any in-
stitution under his supervision whenever it shall appear that such institu-
tion: 
(1) Has violated its articles of incorporation or any law applicable 
thereto; 
(2) Is conducting its business in an unauthorized or unsafe manner, 
or is practicing deception upon its members or the public, or is pursuing 
a plan which is injurious to its members; 
(3) Is not in sound and safe condition to transact its business; 
(4) Has had an impairment of its capital for a period of ninety days; 
(5) Has refused to pay its depositors in accordance with the terms 
on which the deposits were received, or has become otherwise insolvent; 
(6) Has neglected or refused to comply with the terms of a duly and 
legally authorized order issued by the bank commissioner; 
(7) Has refused, upon proper demand, to submit its records and affairs 
for inspection to an examiner of the banking department; or, 
(8) Whenever it shall appear that its officers have refused to be 
examined under oath regarding its affairs. 
7-1U-J-. J-»CUIlIWOaS.—IIIC J.UJ.iUW.Uig w o r u s tu iu . t c i x u o r v u c u u s c u m ui i i ) 
act shall have the following meanings unless the content clearly requires a 
different meaning. The meaning ascribed to the singular form shall apply 
also to the pluraL 
"Person" shall include individuals, copartnerships, associations, trusts, 
corporations, and any other legal entities. 
"License" shall mean a license, issued under the authority of this act, 
to make loans in accordance with the provisions of this act at a single 
place of business. 
"Licensee" shall mean a person to whom one or more licenses have 
been issued. 
"Commissioner" shall mean the bank commissioner of Utah. 
"Department" shall mean the state banking department of Utah. 
"Interested party" as used in section 7-10-19, shall mean and include the 
applicant for a license and any licensee having a place of business in the 
community where the applicant proposes to do business, or any person who 
has aprvoarp'1 flf fhp hearincr or Droceeding before the department. 
63-30-4. Act provisions not construed as admission or denial of liability 
—•Effect of waiver of immunity—Exclusive remedy—Joinder of employee— 
Limitations on personal liability.—Nothing contained in this act, unless 
specifically provided, is to be construed as an admission or denial of lia-
bility or responsibility in so far as governmental entities are concerned. 
Wherein immunity from suit is waived by this act, consent to be sued is 
granted and liability of the entity shall be determined as if the entity were 
a private person. 
The remedy against a governmental entity or its employee for an injury 
caused by an act or omission which occurs during the performance of such 
employee's duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of 
authority is, after the effective date of this act, exclusive of any other civil 
action or proceeding by reason of the same subject matter against the 
employee or the estate of the employee whose act or omission gave rise to 
the claim, unless the employee acted or failed to act through gross negli-
gence, fraud, or malice. 
An employee may be joined in an action against a governmental entity 
in a representative capacity if the act or omission complained of is one for 
which the governmental entity may be liable, but no employee shall be held 
personally liable for acts or omissions occurring during the performance 
of the employee's duties, within the scope of employment or under color 
of authority, unless it is established that the employee acted or failed to act 
due to gross negligence, fraud or malice. 
70B-1-102. Purposes—Rules of construction.—(1) This act shall be 
liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes and 
policies. 
(2) The underlying purposes and policies of this act are: 
(a) to simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing retail in-
stallment sales, consumer credit, small loans and usury; 
(b) to provide rate ceilings to assure an adequate supply of credit 
to consumers; 
(c) to further consumer understanding of the terms of credit trans-
actions and to foster competition among suppliers of consumer 
credit so that consumers may obtain credit at reasonable cost; 
(d) to protect consumer buyers, lessees, and borrowers against unfair 
practices by some suppliers of consumer credit, having due regard 
for the interests of legitimate and scrupulous creditors; 
(e) to permit and encourage the development of fair and economically 
sound credit practices; 
(f) to conform the regulation of consumer credit transactions to 
the policies of the Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act [Act 
of May 29, 1968, P.L. 90-321, 82 Stat 146, 15 TJ.S.C. §§ 1601 to 
1677; 18 XJJS.C. §§891 to 896]; and 
(g) to make uniform the law, including administrative rules, among 
the various jurisdictions. 
(3) A reference to a requirement imposed by this act includes reference 
to a related rule of the administrator adopted pursuant to this act 
70B-3-503. License to make supervised loans.—(1) The administrator 
shall receive and act on all applications for licenses to make supervised 
loans under this act. Applications shall be filed in the manner prescribed 
by the administrator and shall contain the information the administrator 
requires by rule to make an evaluation of the financial responsibility, char-
acter and fitness of the applicant. 
(2) No license shall be issued unless the administrator, upon investiga. 
tion, finds that the financial responsibility, character and fitness of the 
applicant, and of the members thereof (if the applicant is a copartnership 
or association) and of the officers and directors thereof (if the applicant 
is a corporation), are such as to warrant belief that the business will be 
operated honestly and fairly within the purposes of this act. 
(3) Upon written request, the applicant is entitled to a hearing on the 
question of his qualifications for a license if 
(a) the administrator has notified the applicant in writing that hii 
application has been denied, or 
(b) the administrator has not issued a license within sixty days aftei 
the application for the license was filed. A request for a hearing 
may not be made more than fifteen days after the administratoi 
has mailed a writing to the applicant notifying him that the 
application has been denied and stating in substance the admin-
istrator's findings suDDorting denial of the application. 
70B-3-504. Eevocation or suspension of license.—(1) The administra-
tor may issue to a person licensed to make supervised loans an order to 
show cause why his license should not be revoked or suspended for a period 
not in excess of six months. The order shall state the place for a hearing 
and set a time for the hearing that is no less than ten days from the date 
of the order. After the hearing the administrator shall revoke or suspend 
the license if he finds that: 
(a) the licensee has repeatedly and willfully violated this act or any 
rule or order lawfully made pursuant to this act; or 
(b) facts or conditions exist which would clearly have justified the 
administrator in refusing to grant a license had these facts or 
conditions been known to exist at the time the application for 
the license was made. 
(2) No revocation or suspension of a license is lawful unless prior to 
institution of proceedings by the administrator notice is given to the 
licensee of the facts or conduct which warrant the intended action, and 
the licensee is given an opportunity to show compliance with all lawful 
requirements for retention of the license. 
(3) If the administrator finds that probable cause for revocation of a 
license exists and that enforcement of this act requires immediate suspen-
sion of the license pending investigation, he may, after a hearing upon five 
days' written notice, enter an order suspending the license for not more 
than thirty days. 
(4) Whenever the administrator revokes or suspends a license, he 
shall enter an order to that effect and forthwith notify the licensee of the 
revocation or suspension. Within five days after the entry of the order 
he shall deliver to the licensee a copy of the order and the findings sup-
porting the order. 
(5) Any person holding a license to make supervised loans may re-
inquish the license by notifying the administrator in writing of its relin-
luishment, but this relinquishment shall not affect his liability for acts 
>reviously committed. 
(6) No revocation, suspension, or relinquishment of a license shall 
mpair or affect the' obligation of any pre-existing lawful contract between 
he licensee and any debtor. 
(7) The administrator may reinstate a license, terminate & suspension, 
r grant a new license to a person whose license has been revoked or 
ispended if no fact or condition then exists which clearly would have 
istified the administrator in refusing to grant a license. 
70B-3-506. Examinations and investigations.—(1) The administrator 
shall examine periodically at intervals he deems appropriate the loans, 
business, and records of every licensee. In addition, for the purpose 
of discovering violations of this act or securing information lawfully re-
quired, the administrator or the official or agency to whose supervision 
the organization is subject (section 70B-6-105) may at any time investigate 
the loans, business, and records of any regulated lender. For these purposes 
he shall have free and reasonable access to the offices, places of business, 
and records of the lender. 
(2) If the lender's records are located outside this state, the lender 
at his option shall make them available to the administrator at a convenient 
location within this state, or pay the reasonable and necessary expenses 
for the administrator or his representative to examine them at the place 
where they are maintained. The administrator may designate representa-
tives, including comparable officials of the state in which the records are 
located, to inspect them on his behalf. 
(3) For the purposes of this section, the administrator may admin-
ister oaths or affirmations, and upon his own motion or upon request 
of any party may subpoena witnesses, compel their attendance, adduce 
evidence, and require the production of any matter which is relevant to the 
investigation, including the existence, description, nature, custody, con-
dition, and location of any books, documents, or other tangible things 
and the identity and location of persons having knowledge or relevant 
facts, or any other matter reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery 
of admissible evidence. 
(4) Upon failure without lawful excuse to obey a subpoena or to give 
testimony and upon reasonable notice to all persons affected thereby, the 
administrator may apply to the district court where his offices are located 
for an order compelling compliance. 

tions—Reliance on rules—Duty to report.—(1) In addition to other powers 
granted by this act, the administrator within the limitations provided 
by law may: 
(a) receive and act on complaints, take action designed to obtain 
voluntary compliance with this act, or commence proceedings 
on his own initiative; 
(b) counsel persons and groups on their rights and duties under 
this act; 
(c) establish programs for the education of consumers with respect 
to credit practices and problems; 
(d) make studies' appropriate to effectuate the purposes and policies 
of this act and make the results available to the public; 
(e) adopt, amend, and repeal substantive rules when specifically au-
thorized by this act, and adopt, amend, and repeal procedural 
rules to carry out the provisions of this act; 
(f) maintain offices within this state; and 
(g) employ any necessary hearing examiners, clerks, and other em-
ployees and agents. 
(2) The administrator shall adopt rules not "inconsistent with the 
Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act to assure a meaningful disclosure 
of credit terms so that a prospective debtor will be able to compare 
more readily the various credit terms available to him and to avoid the 
uninformed use of credit. These rules may supersede any provisions of this 
act which are inconsistent with the Federal Credit Protection Act if the 
administrator finds such an inconsistency to exist and declares that the 
purpose of superseding this act is to resolve this inconsistency and may 
require disclosure by persons who arrange for the extension of credit, may 
contain classifications, differentiations, or other provisions, and may provide 
for adjustments and exceptions for any class of transactions subject to 
this act which in the judgment of the administrator are necessary or proper 
to effectuate the purposes or to prevent circumvention or evasion of, or to 
facilitate compliance with, the provisions of this act relating to disclosure 
of credit terms. 
(3) To keep the administrator's rules in harmony with the Federal 
Consumer Credit Protection Act and the regulations prescribed from 
time to time pursuant to that act by the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System and with the rules of administrators in other 
jurisdictions which enact the Uniform Consumer Credit Code, the admin-
istrator, so far as is consistent with the purposes, policies and provisions 
of this act, shall : 
(a) before adopting, amending, and repealing rules, advise and consult 
with administrators in other jurisdictions which enact the Uni-
form Consumer Credit Code; and 
x_, w .vguittuuiu BU yrescnuea DJ tne iioard of Governors of 
the Federal Reserve System; and 
(ii) the rules of administrators in other jurisdictions which enact 
the Uniform Consumer Credit Code. 
(4) Except for refund of an excess charge, no liability is imposed 
under this act for an act done or omitted in conformity with a rule of the 
administrator notwithstanding, that after the act or omission the rule 
may be amended or repealed or beydetermined by judicial or other au-
thority to be invalid for any reason. 
(5) The administrator shall report to the governor and legislature on 
the operation of his office, on the use of credit in the state, and on the 
problems of persons of small means obtaining credit from persons regularly 
engaged in extending sales or loan credit. For the purpose of making the 
report, the administrator is authorized to conduct research and make ap-
propriate studies. The report shall include a description of the examination 
and investigation procedures and policies of his office, a statement of policies 
followed in deciding whether to investigate or examine the offices of credit 
suppliers subject to this act, a statement of the number and percentages of 
offices which are periodically investigated or examined, a statement of the 
types of consumer credit problems of both creditors and debtors which 
have come to his attention through his examinations and investigations and 
the disposition of them under existing law, a statement of the extent to 
which the rules of the administrator pursuant to this act are not in harmony 
with the regulations prescribed by the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System pursuant to the Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act 
or the rules of administrators in other jurisdictions which enact the Uni-
form Consumer Credit Code and the reasons for such variations, and a 
general statement of the activities of his office and of others to promote the 
purposes of this act. The report shall not identify the creditors against 
whom action is taken by the administrator. 
70B-6-109. Assurance of discontinuance.—If it is claimed that a person 
has engaged in conduct subject to an order by the administrator (section 
70B-6-108) or by a court (sections 70B-6-110 through 70B-6-112), the 
administrator may accept an assurance in writing that the person will not 
engage in the conduct in the future. If a person giving an assurance of 
discontinuance fails to comply with its terms, the assurance is evidence 
that prior to the assurance he engaged in the conduct described in the 
assurance. 
70B-6-110. Injunctions against violations of act.—The administrator 
may bring a civil action to restrain a person from violating this act and 
for other appropriate relief-
78-2-2. Supreme Court jurisdiction. 
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer questions of 
state law certified by a court of the United States. 
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary 
writs and authority to issue all writs and process necessary to carry into effect 
its orders, judgments, and decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals; 
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals prior 
to final judgment by the Court of Appeals; 
(c) discipline of lawyers; 
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission; 
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative proceedings originat-
ing with: 
(i) the Public Service Commission; 
(ii) the State Tax Commission; 
(iii) the Board of State Lands and Forestry; 
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining; or 
(v) the state engineer; 
(f) final orders and decrees of the district court review of informal adju-
dicative proceedings of agencies under Subsection (e); 
(g) a final judgment or decree of any court of record holding a statute of 
the United States or this state unconstitutional on its face under the 
Constitution of the United States or the Utah Constitution; 
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of record involving a charge of 
a first degree or capital felony; 
(i) appeals from the district court involving a conviction of a first de-
gree or capital felony; and 
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the 
Court of Appeals does not have original appellate iurisdiction. 
78-12-25. Within four years. 
Within four years: 
(1) an action upon a contract, obligation or liability not founded upon 
an instrument in writing; also on an open account for goods, wares and 
merchandise, and for any article charged in a store account; also on an 
open account for work, labor or services rendered, or materials furnished; 
provided, that action in all of the foregoing cases may be commenced at 
any time within four years after the last charge is made or the last 
payment is received. 
(2) an action for relief not otherwise provided for by law. 
78-12-26. Within three years.—Within three years: 
(1) An action for waste, or trespass upon or injury to real property; 
provided, that when waste or trespass is committed by means of under-
ground works upon any mining claim, the cause of action shall not be 
deemed to have accrued until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the 
facts constituting such waste or trespass. 
(2) An action for taking, detaining or injuring personal property, 
including actions for specific recovery thereof; provided, that in all cases 
where the subject of the action is a domestic animal usually included in 
the term 'livestock," having upon it at the time of its loss a recorded 
mark or brand, if such animal had strayed or was stolen from the true 
owner without his fault, the cause shall not be deemed to have accrued 
until the owner has actual knowledge of such facts as would put a 
reasonable man upon inquiry as to the possession thereof by the defendant. 
(3) An action for relief on the ground of fraud or mistake; but the 
cause of action in such case shall not be deemed to have accrued until 
the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud 
or mistake. 
(4) An action for a liability created by the statutes of this state, other 
than for a penalty or forfeiture under the laws of this state, except where 
in special cases a different limitation is prescribed by the statutes of this 
state. 
78-12-28. Within two years.—Within two years: 
(1) An action against a marshal, sheriff, constable or other officer upon 
a liability incurred by the doing of an act in his official capacity, and in 
virtue of his office, or by the omission of an official duty, including the 
nonpayment of money collected upon an execution; but this section shall 
noVapply to an action for an escape. 
(2) An action to recover damages for the death of one caused by the 
wrongful act or neglect of another. 
78-12-29. Within one year. 
Within one year: 
(1) an action for liability created by the statutes of a foreign state. 
(2) an action upon a statute for a penalty or forfeiture where the action 
is given to an individual, or to an individual and the state, except when 
the statute imposing it prescribes a different limitation. 
(3) an action upon a statute, or upon an undertaking in a criminal 
action, for a forfeiture or penalty to the state. 
(4) an action for libel, slander, assault, battery, false imprisonment or 
seduction. 
(5) an action against a sheriff or other officer for the escape of a pris-
oner arrested or imprisoned upon either civil or criminal process. 
(6) an action against a municipal corporation for damages or injuries to 
property caused by a mob or riot. 
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PLEASANT GROVE FINANCE COMPANY 
10% CAPITAL DEBENTURE BOND 
PLEASANT GROVE FINANCE COMPANY, a Utah corporation (hcremalier sometimes called the 
"Company") hereby acknowledges itself Indebted and (or value received promises to pay to 
WESLEY R. or MAYBELLE F. DICKERSON jt/wros 
\ 
who resides at ^ 3
 W e s t 7 Q 0 S o u t h In the d y of 0 r e m > U t a h 3 4 3 5 7 
State of Utah, in 60 months from date, the sum of 
*TWENTY THOUSAND AND no/100 D O L L A R S * ^ ^ ^ ^ * * ^ ^ * * ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
and to pay interest thereon at the rate of ten percent (10%) per year, payable or compounded quarterly on th€ 
31 st day of March. 30th day of June, 30th day of September and the 31 st day of December in each year, unti 
maturity Both principal and interest are payable at or through the office of the Company m the City of Pleasan 
Grove. Utah in any can or currency which at the time of payment may be legal tender lor public and private debts 
This Debenture is one of a duly authorized issue of debentures of the Company designated as its Series 
10% Debentures, due in sixty (50) months from the dale of issue. -
This Debenture is subject to redemption before maturity at the option of the Company on any interest pa> 
ment date. Tne redemption price shall be the principal amount plus accrued interest. 
The Company and the Registrar may treat the record owner as actual and beneficial owner lor all purposes, 
notwithstanding notice to the contrary. The debenture holder may transfer this debenture by surrender to the 
Registrar of the debenture, properly endorsed, together with interest pass book, if any. and proper instructions 
lor registering the new owners. 
This Debenture has not been registered with any regulatory agency In the opinion of counsel. Us issuance 
is exempt from registration The deoenture holder has. by his signature on the subscription agreement, warrantee 
thai his purchase is "lor investment purposes'* and accepted all provisions thereol 
Neither this Debenture nor the accrued interest hereon sholl become or be valid or obligatory for zrr) 
purpose until this debenture is authenticated by the signatures of the Registrar and officers endorsed hereon 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF. Pleasant Grove Finance Company has caused the signature of its president, arx 
Its corporate seal to be hereunto affixed, attested by the signature of its secretary as of this 1ST 
' day of A o n ' 1 . 1980 
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